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Abstract 
This dissertation examines young children’s acceptance of, memory for, and 
doubts about counterintuitive claims. In Study 1, children aged 3- to 5-years in the United 
States and China were asked to categorize hybrids whose perceptual features originated 
from two different animals or two different objects (75% from one and 25% from the 
other). At first, most children categorized the hybrids in terms of their predominant 
perceptual features. However, after hearing counter-perceptual categorizations by an 
adult, children categorized fewer hybrids in terms of their predominant features. When 
retested 1-to 2-weeks later, the adult’s earlier counter-intuitive categorizations still 
impacted children’s categorizations but less strongly.   
In Study 2, American children aged 3- to 6-years were presented with three 
different-sized Russian dolls and asked to say which doll was the heaviest. Most children 
pointed to the biggest doll. They were then told that the smallest doll was the heaviest 
and that the biggest was the lightest, a claim that was false. Most children subsequently 
endorsed this claim. Nevertheless, when the experimenter left the room, older children 
were likely to check it by lifting the biggest and smallest dolls. Younger children rarely 
conducted such checks.  
In Study 3, Chinese preschool and elementary school children were presented 
with five different-sized Russian dolls and asked to indicate the heaviest doll. Half of the 
children then heard a false, counter-intuitive claim (i.e., smallest = heaviest). The 
remaining children heard a claim confirming their intuitions (i.e., biggest = heaviest). 
Again, most children endorsed the experimenter’s claim even when it was counter-
vii 
intuitive. During the experimenter’s subsequent absence, elementary school children 
explored the dolls more if they had received counter-intuitive rather than confirming 
testimony. Preschool children rarely explored no matter what testimony they had 
received. On the experimenter’s return, children who had explored the dolls were likely 
to reject her counter-intuitive claim.  
Thus, counterintuitive claims can overturn children’s beliefs but their influence 
fades over time and is moderated by children’s opportunities to search for empirical 
evidence. Across two cultures, older children were more inclined than younger children 
to use opportunities to seek empirical evidence to check counterintuitive claims. 
1 
Introduction 
In a very short amount of time, young children develop a complex understanding 
of the physical and social world. In this task, they are aided by their ability to learn from 
multiple sources of information. They can learn from their own first-hand experiences 
through observation, exploration, and experimentation. They can also learn by listening 
to what other people tell them and by asking questions. Critically, these different sources 
of information are sometimes consistent, but they sometimes conflict with one another; 
conflict is particularly likely when children are learning about hidden or unobservable 
phenomena. For example, to understand heliocentrism, children must override their first-
hand perceptions (every day, the sun appears to move relative to a fixed earth). An 
important question for cognitive science and developmental psychology is how children 
resolve such conflicts and how children’s resolution of such conflicts influences their 
beliefs (Gelman, 2009). Although developmental psychology has made great strides in 
understanding the strategies children use to identify reliable informants and reliable 
testimony (Harris, 2012), we know relatively little about how children integrate 
testimony that conflicts with their perceptions and intuitions into their existing beliefs.  
This dissertation addresses this topic by investigating: (1) the long-term impact of 
receiving socially-transmitted, counterintuitive information on children’s beliefs; (2) 
children’s search for evidence, especially observational evidence, following claims that 
contradict their intuitions.   
Most research on children’s acquisition of counterintuitive and counter-perceptual 
ideas has focused on the immediate impact of testimony on children’s beliefs, and thus 
we know less about its influence in the longer term (for a review, see Lane & Harris, 
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2014). Understanding the longer term impact of counterintuitive testimony is important 
because it clarifies the role of testimony in children’s acquisition of such beliefs. 
Conceivably, the impact of counterintuitive testimony on children’s beliefs may be short-
lived. A single exposure to a counterintuitive claim from a single informant may be 
enough to shift children’s beliefs in that moment, but not days or weeks later. This is 
because in the long-term children’s beliefs might revert to their initial judgments 
especially if they are presented once again with the original perceptual evidence. This 
would suggest that children’s acquisition of counterintuitive and counter-perceptual 
beliefs is protracted and requires repeated exposures to counter-testimony. On the other 
hand, one exposure to testimony from a single informant may be enough to change 
children’s beliefs about certain counter-perceptual or counterintuitive ideas, especially if 
that testimony comes from a trusted source and has some empirical support. In Study 1, I 
examine whether such testimony does indeed influence children’s beliefs after a delay of 
2- to 3-weeks.
In Study 1, it was not possible for children to gather evidence to check the 
counter-perceptual claim that the informant had made. For example, children did not have 
the opportunity to ask someone else to corroborate the claim that the informant had made; 
nor could they make further observations of the pictured items to check on the properties 
they had inferred. However, outside the laboratory children may seek such additional 
evidence. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that infants and preschoolers seek further 
evidence when they observe events that are counter-intuitive (Legare, 2014; Legare, 
Wellman, & Gelman, 2010; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015; Schulz, 2012). Thus, it is plausible 
that children will also seek further evidence following a claim that is counter-intuitive. 
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Whether children seek such evidence may play an important role in children’s longer-
term acceptance or rejection of what they were told. Alternatively, it is possible that 
counterintuitive claims may not trigger children’s search for evidence and that children 
may simply either accept or reject such claims. Indeed, experimental research and 
mathematical models of learning suggest that instruction restricts children’s exploration 
by reducing the number of hypotheses children consider and therefore reduces the need to 
collect information testing these alternative hypotheses (e.g., Bonawitz et al., 2011; 
Shafto, Goodman, & Frank, 2012). 
Children’s memory for, and evaluation of, socially-transmitted, counterintuitive 
information may be influenced by children’s socio-cultural context in important ways. 
Indeed, a large body of Anthropological and Psychological research demonstrates the 
important role of cultural beliefs and practices in shaping parents’ child rearing goals and 
philosophies, and, in turn, how children learn (Lancy, Gaskins, Bock, 2009; Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Rogoff, 2003). Comparing children 
growing up in different cultural contexts reveals universals as well as variations in 
developmental outcomes and thus provides insights about the important role of context 
on children’s development. To explore whether, and if so to what extent, context 
influences how children acquire socially-transmitted, counterintuitive information, this 
dissertation compares the longer term influence of counter-perceptual testimony on 
American (Study 1A) and Chinese children’s belief (Study 1B) as well as the influence of 
counter-intuitive testimony on American (Study 2) and Chinese (Study 3) children’s 
search for confirmatory empirical evidence following such claims. American and Chinese 
children were chosen as comparative samples because previous work has identified 
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important differences between the child rearing beliefs and practices of Chinese and 
American parents (e.g., Chen & French, 2008; Harkness, Mavridis, Liu, Super, 2015; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and between the pedagogical beliefs and practices of Chinese 
and American preschool teachers (Wang, Elicker, McMullen, & Mao, 2008). In general, 
American parents tend to emphasize independence and self-expression while Chinese 
parents emphasize deference and social harmony (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The 
relative emphasis on individuality in the U.S. is also apparent in the pedagogical beliefs 
and practices of American and Chinese preschool teachers. Wang et al. (2008) found that, 
on average, Chinese teachers were more likely to endorse teacher-structured instructional 
approaches than U.S. teachers. While U.S. teachers were more likely to endorse less 
formal, less structured, child-initiated pedagogy. These differences in American and 
Chinese children’s experiences at home and at school are likely to influence both their 
memory for counter-intuitive claims and their search for confirmatory evidence following 
such claims.  
The socialization of Chinese children may lead them to place greater confidence 
in the counter-intuitive claims offered by an experimenter while American children’s 
own socialization may lead them to place greater confidence in their own intuitions. 
Indeed, previous research has found that Chinese-American and Chinese children are 
more likely to endorse counter-perceptual testimony provided by a consensus of multiple 
informants than European-American children (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Corriveau, 
Kim, Song, & Harris, 2013). It is therefore possible, that Chinese children’s greater 
consideration of the testimony they receive will also lead them to better encode and 
remember counter-intuitive claims than American children. It is unclear whether 
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American and Chinese children will differ in their propensity to seek evidence following 
the experimenter’s counter-intuitive claim. Following the experimenter’s counter-
intuitive claim, Chinese children may be more likely to endorse the claim but nonetheless 
wonder whether they were right to do so. In contrast, American children may be more 
likely to reject the testimony of the experimenter but they may also wonder whether they 
were right to do so. In both cases, the experimenter’s testimony may lead children to seek 
confirmatory evidence for the counter-intuitive claim to assuage their doubts about their 
evaluation of it. Cross-country differences in the endorsement but not in the testing of 
counter-intuitive claims would suggest important but rather subtle differences in how 
children approach such claims. It would suggest a difference in children’s initial 
consideration of these claims but not necessarily a difference in their long-term 
acceptance of them – acceptance being determined by children’s search for additional 
information regarding the counter-intuitive claim.   
In the following sections, I present the result of these three empirical studies. 
Each study begins with its own introduction and includes a description of the method and 
analyses used in the study. I have included a discussion of the implication of the results 
within each study but conclude with summative discussion that brings together the results 
of the three studies and discusses implications for research and education.  
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Study 1: The	influence	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	fades	over	time:	
Evidence	from	Chinese	and	American	children	
7 
Children	learn	through	observation	and	from	the	testimony	of	other	people.	These	two	different	sources	of	information	are	sometimes	consistent	with	each	other,	but	they	sometimes	conflict	(Harris	&	Koenig,	2006;	Lane	&	Harris,	2014).	In	cases	of	conflict,	children	are	surprisingly	willing	to	defer	to	counter-perceptual	testimony.	Gelman	and	Markman	(1986;	1987)	showed	that	when	preschoolers	are	presented	with	a	label	for	an	animal	that	conflicts	with	its	appearance,	they	rely	on	that	label	rather	than	on	its	appearance	to	make	inductive	inferences.	For	example,	children	were	shown	a	drawing	of	a	flamingo	and	a	drawing	of	a	bat	and	told	that	the	flamingo’s	legs	got	cold	at	night	whereas	the	legs	of	the	bat	got	warm	at	night.	Children	were	then	presented	with	a	picture	of	another	creature	which	looked	like	a	bat	but	which	the	experimenter	introduced	as	a	bird.	Children	often	inferred	that	this	new	creature’s	legs	got	cold	at	night	–	a	response	consistent	with	the	way	it	had	been	categorized	by	the	experimenter	but	not	with	the	animal’s	appearance.			Children	are	especially	willing	to	endorse	counter-perceptual	claims	when	they	are	made	by	knowledgeable	informants	(e.g.,	Lane	&	Harris,	2015)	and	when	those	claims	have	some	empirical	support	(e.g.,	Bernard,	Harris,	Terrier,	&	Clément,	2015;	Chan	&	Tardif,	2013;	Jaswal,	2004;	Lopez-Mobilia	&	Woolley,	2016).	Importantly,	children	will	convey	such	counter-perceptual	claims	to	someone	else	(Jaswal,	Lima,	&	Small,	2009)	suggesting	that	their	endorsement	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	reflects	belief-change	rather	than	simple	compliance.	However,	children’s	willingness	to	endorse	counter-perceptual	claims	has	limits.	Children	typically	reject	claims	that	directly	contradict	what	they	know	or	what	they	see	(e.g.,	Clément,	Koenig,	&	Harris,	2004;	Koenig	&	Echols,	2003;	Lane,	Harris,	
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Gelman,	Wellman,	2014;	Ma	&	Ganea,	2009;	Pea,	1982;	Robinson,	Champion,	&	Mitchell,	1999;	Robinson,	Mitchell,	&	Nye,	1995).	Thus,	children	are	not	indifferent	to	the	available	perceptual	evidence	but	under	certain	circumstances,	they	are	willing	to	base	their	beliefs	on	counter-perceptual	testimony.		The	primary	aim	of	these	studies	was	to	test	the	influence	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs	over	time.	Most	research	on	children’s	acceptance	of	counter-perceptual	claims	has	focused	on	the	immediate	impact	of	such	claims	on	their	beliefs.	We	know	little	about	their	influence	in	the	longer	term.	Conceivably,	the	impact	of	a	counter-perceptual	claim	on	children’s	beliefs	is	short-lived.	A	single	exposure	to	a	counter-perceptual	claim	from	a	single	informant	may	be	enough	to	shift	children’s	beliefs	in	that	moment,	but	not	days	or	weeks	later.	In	the	long-term,	children’s	beliefs	might	revert	to	their	initial	judgments	especially	if	they	are	presented	once	again	with	the	original	perceptual	evidence.	This	would	suggest	that	children’s	acquisition	of	counter-perceptual	beliefs	might	be	protracted	and	require	repeated	exposures	to	a	counter-perceptual	claim	for	those	beliefs	to	take	hold.	On	the	other	hand,	one	exposure	to	a	counter-perceptual	claim	from	a	single	informant	may	be	enough	to	ensure	children’s	continued	acceptance.			To	test	whether	the	effect	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	is	short-lived	or	more	long	lasting,	we	asked	3-	to	5-year-old	children	to	categorize	hybrid	pictures	of	animals	and	objects	(Bernard	et	al.,	2015;	Corriveau	et	al.,	2009c;	Jaswal,	2004;	Jaswal	&	Markman,	2007).	These	hybrids	take	75%	of	their	perceptual	features	from	one	animal	or	object	and	25%	of	their	perceptual	features	from	a	different	animal	or	object	(Jaswal	et	al.,	2009).	Initially,	children	typically	choose	to	categorize	these	
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hybrids	according	to	the	majority	of	their	characteristics—an	animal	that	appears	to	be	75%	cat	and	25%	dog	is	typically	judged	to	be	a	cat	(Bernard	et	al.,	2015;	Corriveau	et	al.,	2009c;	Jaswal,	2004;	Jaswal	&	Markman,	2007).	Immediately	following	their	initial	categorization	of	the	hybrid,	an	informant	gave	children	testimony	that	countered	their	initial	judgments.	Thus,	children	received	counter-testimony	on	every	trial	whether	or	not	children	initially	categorized	a	hybrid	based	on	its	majority	characteristics.	By	providing	counter-testimony	whether	children	initially	categorized	the	hybrids	based	on	its	majority	characteristics	or	not	we	ensured	that	all	children	would	receive	the	same	amount	of	counter-testimony	from	the	informant.	To	assess	the	immediate	impact	of	such	testimony	on	children’s	categorization	of	the	hybrid,	children	were	asked	to	make	an	inference	about	it.	They	could	base	this	inference	either	on	their	initial	judgment	or	on	the	subsequent	counter-claim	made	by	the	informant.	In	Study	1,	we	asked	children	to	categorize	the	hybrid	pictures	a	second	time,	approximately	1-2	weeks	later.	In	Study	2,	we	asked	children	to	categorize	the	hybrids	either	at	1-2	weeks	later	(short	delay)	or	3-6	weeks	later	(long	delay).	By	restricting	our	analyses	to	items	that	children	had	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	features	of	the	hybrids,	this	procedure	allowed	us	to	assess	the	immediate	and	longer-term	impact	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs.		Although	previous	research	has	not	examined	the	long-term	impact	of	such	testimony,	we	do	know	that	children	remember	the	characteristics	of	informants	after	a	delay	and	use	that	information	when	deciding	which	informant	to	trust.	Corriveau	and	Harris	(2009a)	introduced	3-	and	4-year-old	children	to	two	
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informants,	one	who	labeled	familiar	objects	correctly	and	one	who	did	not.	When	presented	with	novel	information	by	these	two	informants	immediately	after	learning	about	their	labeling	abilities,	children	endorsed	the	information	provided	by	the	accurate	informant	over	the	information	provided	by	the	inaccurate	informant.	When	these	two	informants	presented	new	labels	for	new	objects	a	week	later,	children	continued	to	prefer	the	previously	accurate	informant’s	labels.	By	implication,	children	can	remember	the	epistemic	characteristics	of	informants,	and	memory	for	those	characteristics	might	have	both	an	immediate	and	a	lingering	effect	on	children’s	subsequent	endorsement	of	claims	made	by	that	informant.	Indeed,	young	preschoolers	appear	to	encode	the	information	provided	by	an	informant	differently	depending	on	his	or	her	epistemic	characteristics.	Sabbagh	and	Shafman	(2009)	taught	4-	and	5-year-old	children	new	words	for	novel	objects.	They	manipulated	whether	children	learned	these	words	from	an	informant	who	was	knowledgeable	or	from	an	informant	who	was	ignorant.	Children	were	then	asked	to	name	the	object	(i.e.,	“Which	one	is	the	blicket?”)	or	to	recall	what	had	been	said	(i.e.,	“Which	one	did	I	say	is	the	blicket?”).	Children	who	learned	the	label	from	the	knowledgeable	speaker	correctly	answered	both	types	of	questions	immediately	and	after	a	five-minute	delay.	In	contrast,	children	who	learned	the	words	from	the	ignorant	speaker	could	initially	recall	what	the	informant	had	said	but	not	what	the	object	was	called.	Moreover,	after	the	five-minute	delay,	they	failed	to	answer	both	types	of	questions	correctly.	This	suggests	that	informants’	epistemic	qualities	moderate	how	strongly	children	encode	and	retain	the	semantic	information	they	are	taught.		
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Thus,	a	subsidiary	aim	of	this	study	was	to	test	whether	the	longer-term	effect	of	counter-intuitive	testimony	on	children’s	belief	is	moderated	by	characteristics	of	the	informant.	Recall	that	immediately	following	their	initial	categorization	of	the	hybrid,	an	informant	gave	children	testimony	that	countered	their	initial	judgments	–	that	informant	was	identified	as	a	teacher	for	4	items	and	as	a	mother	for	4	items.	We	selected	a	teacher	and	a	mother	as	informants	because	these	informants	are	familiar	and	generally	trusted	by	preschoolers.	We	decided	to	not	have	children’s	own	mother	or	teacher	present	the	testimony.	Instead,	to	control	for	the	effects	of	attachment	and	familiarity	(Corriveau	et	al.,	2009c;	Corriveau	&	Harris,	2009b)	children	were	introduced	to	two	novel	women	(on	video)	who	were	designated	as	a	“mother”	and	as	a	“teacher”,	respectively.	To	highlight	their	distinctive	identities	and	roles,	we	introduced	the	mother	as	“a	mom	who	has	a	child	the	same	age	as	you”	and	the	teacher	as	“a	teacher	who	teaches	children	the	same	age	as	you.”	Counter-balancing	(across	children)	which	woman	was	designated	as	a	mother	versus	a	teacher	ruled	out	the	possibility	that	individual	characteristics	of	either	woman	would	drive	differences	in	children’s	receptivity	to	teachers’	versus	mothers’	claims.	In	addition,	by	using	a	video	presentation,	the	women’s	vocal	delivery,	gestures,	and	facial	expressions	could	be	well	matched.		By	having	two	informants	we	could	test	whether	the	immediate	and	longer-term	impact	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	is	moderated	by	the	qualities	of	the	informant.	Based	on	the	results	of	Sabbagh	and	Shafman	(2009)	we	expected	that	the	immediate	impact	of	testimony	would	be	same	whether	children	received	testimony	from	the	teacher	or	the	mother.	However,	we	tentatively	hypothesized	
12 
that,	in	the	longer-term,	children	would	be	more	influenced	by	the	teacher’s	testimony.	We	made	this	prediction	for	two	reasons.	First,	preschoolers	understand	that	those	who	teach	are	particularly	knowledgeable	(Ziv	&	Frye,	2004)	and	so	they	might	expect	teachers	to	be	more	knowledgeable	than	mothers.		Second,	both	American	and	Chinese	preschoolers	affirm	teachers’	authority	to	establish	social	and	moral	rules	(Tisak,	Crane-Ross,	&	Tisak,	2000;	Yau,	&	Smetana,	2003).	These	conceptions	of	teachers	might	impact	children’s	long-term	retention	of	their	claims.		We	also	anticipated	that	children’s	trust	in	these	two	informants	might	vary	across	cultural	contexts.	Specifically,	we	anticipated	that	the	sort	of	pedagogy	that	children	are	exposed	to	would	influence	their	trust	in	teachers	vs.	mothers.	Chinese	preschool	teachers	endorse	a	more	teacher-directed	pedagogy	than	American	preschool	teachers	(Wang,	Elicker,	McMullen,	&	Mao,	2008).	Thus,	Chinese	preschoolers	are	likely	to	be	exposed	to	more	explicit	and	formal	instruction	than	American	preschoolers	and	this	may	make	teachers’	expertise	more	salient	to	Chinese	preschoolers.	Indeed,	direct	instruction	is	particularly	memorable	for	preschoolers.	Four-year-olds	are	more	likely	to	acknowledge	that	they	have	just	learned	something,	rather	than	having	known	it	all	along,	when	what	they	learned	was	directly	taught	to	them	rather	than	embedded	in	a	story	(Taylor,	Esbensen,	&	Bennett,	1994).		Moreover,	previous	research	has	found	that	Chinese-American	children	are	more	willing	than	European-American	children	to	defer	to	counter-perceptual	testimony	(Corriveau	&	Harris,	2010;	Corriveau,	Kim,	Song,	&	Harris,	2013).	These	findings	have	been	interpreted	in	light	of	a	more	general	cultural	differences	in	deference	to	authority	(Chen	&	French,	2008;	Markus	&	Kitayama,	
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1991).	Such	deference	that	may	be	particularly	marked	for	an	informant	explicitly	identified	as	a	teacher	given	that	respect	for	teachers	is	an	important	Confucian	virtue	that	has	remained	central	to	Chinese	children’s	conception	of	learning	(Li,	2012).	Thus,	we	recruited	Chinese	preschoolers	in	Study	1A	and	American	preschoolers	in	Study	1B.			 In	sum,	the	primary	aim	of	this	study	was	to	test	the	longer-term	influence	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs	by	comparing	its	influence	on	children’s	categorization	of	hybrid	objects	and	animals	immediately	after	they	receive	counter-perceptual	testimoy	and	after	a	delay.	Subsidiary	aims	were	to	explore	whether	any	longer-term	effect	of	testimony	are	influenced	by	the	source	of	that	testimony,	and	whether	such	effects	are	the	same	or	different	in	China	and	the	United	States.		
Study	1A	
	
Participants		 We	recruited	a	total	of	48	children	from	three	preschools	in	Beijing,	China	(24	girls;	M	age	=	4.78	years,	Range	=	3.44	–	5.98).	For	analytic	purposes,	we	divided	these	children	into	two	age	groups:	4-year-old	children	(n	=	29,	15	girls;	M	age	=	4.35	years,	Range	=	3.44	–	4.99)	and	5-year-old	children	(n	=	19,	7	girls;	M	age	=	5.44	years,	Range	=	5.01	–	5.98).	We	obtained	a	relatively	diverse	sample.	Parents	reported	having	completed:	some	high	school	(23%),	high	school	(10%),	some	college	(23%),	college	(29%),	and	graduate	school	(15%).	All	children	were	Han	Chinese.	The	surveys	were	completed	by	the	children’s	mothers	(70%),	fathers	(27%),	or	unspecified	(3%).	Three	additional	children	were	recruited	but	were	not	
 14 
included	in	our	analyses	because	they	did	not	complete	the	follow-up	testing	session.		
Procedure	A	native	speaker	of	Mandarin	tested	children	individually	in	a	quiet	room	at	their	school.	The	protocol	was	translated	from	English	to	Mandarin	by	fluent,	bilingual	English-Mandarin	speakers	and	back	translated	to	confirm	the	translation.		Two	iPads	were	placed	in	front	of	the	child,	each	displaying	a	picture	of	one	of	the	two	informants	in	front	of	a	blue	background.	The	informants	were	both	women	in	their	mid-	to	late-thirties	and	wore	similar	clothing.	The	experimenter	said:	“I	know	these	two	women.	This	woman	is	a	teacher.	She	teaches	children	the	same	age	as	you.	This	woman	is	a	mom.	She	has	a	boy/girl	the	same	age	as	you.”	Whether	the	teacher	or	the	mother	was	introduced	first	and	whether	informant	1	or	2	was	identified	as	the	teacher	or	the	mother	was	counterbalanced	across	children.	Next,	as	a	memory	check,	children	were	asked	to	point	to	the	teacher	and	the	mother.	All	children	passed	these	comprehension	checks.	Children	were	then	told:	“We’re	going	to	look	at	some	animals	and	objects.	Then	one	of	these	two	women	will	tell	you	about	them.	After	that	I	will	ask	you	some	questions.”	Children	were	shown	four	laminated	hybrid-animal	pictures	and	four	laminated	hybrid-object	pictures,	each	8.5	inches	by	11	inches	(Table	1,	U.S.;	Table	2,	China).	These	hybrids,	used	in	prior	research,	combine	75%	of	features	of	one	animal	or	object	with	25%	of	the	features	from	a	different	animal	or	object	(Bernard	et	al.,	2015;	Corriveau	et	al.,	2009c;	Jaswal,	2004;	Jaswal	&	Markman,	2007).	For	example,	the	cat-dog	is	composed	of	75%	cat	features	and	25%	dog	features.	We	
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conducted	pilot	testing	with	these	hybrids	to	create	two	sets	(detailed	in	Appendix	A).	Each	set	was	composed	of	two	animals	and	two	objects	that	were	similarly	ambiguous	across	our	target	age-range.		Before	testing	each	child,	the	experimenter	shuffled	these	eight	pictures	to	randomize	the	order	of	their	presentation.	Children	were	shown	each	picture	one	at	a	time	and	told:	“I	am	going	to	show	you	a	picture,	do	you	think	this	is	a	[75%	label]	or	a	[25%	label]?”	The	order	of	the	labels	was	counterbalanced	across	children.	After	children	had	selected	a	label,	the	experimenter	told	children,	“Let’s	ask	the	[teacher/mother]”,	and	played	the	video	of	the	informant	naming	the	hybrid.	For	each	trial,	children	received	testimony	from	only	one	informant.	The	mother	provided	information	about	4	hybrids	and	the	teacher	provided	information	about	4	hybrids.	The	four	hybrids	that	each	informant	provided	testimony	about	were	counterbalanced	across	children.	For	half	the	children	within	each	age	group,	the	teacher	provided	information	about	the	hybrids	in	set	1	and	the	mother	provided	information	about	the	hybrids	in	set	2.	The	reverse	was	true	for	the	other	half	of	children	in	each	age	group.	Because	the	pictures	were	presented	in	a	random	order,	the	claims	made	by	a	given	informant	were	not	blocked	(i.e.,	they	went	back	and	forth	between	informants	depending	on	which	item	was	randomly	selected).	The	informant	always	stated	that	the	hybrid	was	the	opposite	of	what	the	child	believed.	For	example,	if	the	child	stated	that	cat-dog	was	“a	dog”	the	informant	in	the	video	would	say	(holding	the	same	picture	of	the	cat-dog	presented	to	the	child):	“This	is	a	cat”.		
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Following	this	testimony,	children’s	receptivity	to	the	informant’s	categorization	was	assessed	by	asking	them	to	make	an	inference	about	the	hybrid.	For	example,	for	the	cat-dog,	children	were	asked:	“Do	you	think	this	animal	barks	or	meows?”	Thus,	children	were	asked	to	make	an	inference,	which	they	could	base	either	on	their	initial	judgment	or	on	the	subsequent	counter-claim	made	by	the	informant	(for	the	inference	questions,	see	Appendix	A).		To	assess	whether	the	testimony	children	received	influenced	their	longer-term	categorization	of	the	hybrid,	children	were	questioned	again	in	a	second	test	session.	They	were	shown	the	same	hybrid	pictures	approximately	1-2	weeks	later	(Range:	7	-	18	days,	M	=	12	days,	SD	=	4)	and	asked	to	categorize	them	once	again.	The	experimenter	shuffled	the	eight	hybrid	pictures	before	testing	each	child	to	randomize	the	order	of	their	presentation.	Children	were	shown	each	picture	one	at	a	time	and	told:	“I	am	going	to	show	you	a	picture,	do	you	think	this	is	a	[75%	label]	or	a	[25%	label]?”	The	order	of	the	labels	was	counterbalanced	across	children.	Children	were	not	reminded	that	they	had	seen	the	pictures	before	but	the	experimenter	was	familiar	to	them	from	the	initial	test	session.		
Results	
	 To	assess	the	shorter-	and	longer-term	impact	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs,	we	restricted	our	analyses	to	the	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	hybrids’	majority	features,	i.e.,	items	for	which	they	received	testimony	that	was	both	inconsistent	with	their	initial	judgments	and	inconsistent	with	the	majority	of	the	entities’	visible	features.	As	expected,	children	were	initially	likely	to	categorize	entities	in	terms	of	the	majority	of	their	visible	
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features:	5.5	items	out	of	8	items	(SD	=	1.35,	Range	=	2	-	8),	a	number	significantly	above	chance	(i.e.,	4.00),	t(47)	=	17.93,	p	<.001.	A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	the	number	of	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	of	the	entities’	visible	features	with	the	within-subject	factor	of	Informant	(2:	Mother	vs.	Teacher)	and	the	between-subjects	factor	of	Age	(2:	4-	vs.	5-years-old)	revealed	no	significant	effect	of	Informant,	F(1,	47)	=	.27,	Age,	F(1,	47)	=	1.06,	and	no	interaction	between	Informant	and	Age,	F(1,	47)	=	.06.	Thus,	irrespective	of	age	and	no	matter	which	informant	the	experimenter	proceeded	to	consult,	children	were	initially	prone	to	base	their	categorization	of	the	hybrids	on	their	majority	perceptual	features.	To	assess	the	effect	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	subsequent	categorization	of	the	hybrids,	both	immediately	and	in	the	longer	term,	we	coded	children’s	category-based	inferences	immediately	following	the	informant’s	testimony	(e.g.,	“Do	you	think	this	animal	barks	or	meows?”),	and	their	category	labels	when	they	were	re-questioned	in	the	second	test	session	(e.g.,	“Do	you	think	this	is	a	cat	or	a	dog?”),	restricting	analysis	to	those	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	features	of	the	hybrids.	With	respect	to	both	judgments,	children’s	replies	were	coded	in	terms	of	whether	or	not	their	responses	matched	the	majority	of	the	perceptual	evidence	present	in	the	pictures	of	the	hybrids.	Children	received	1	point	for	each	response	that	continued	to	match	the	perceptual	evidence	and	0	points	otherwise.	For	example,	children	received	1	point	if	they	called	the	75%/25%	cat/dog	hybrid	a	“cat”,	and	0	points	if	they	called	it	a	“dog”.		
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To	investigate	the	effect	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	categorization	of	the	hybrids	in	the	nearer	and	longer	term,	we	used	a	multilevel	logistic	regression	model	(using	the	–xtlogic–	command	in	Stata	14)	to	regress	whether	children	categorized	an	item	based	on	the	majority	of	its	perceptual	features	(or	not)	on	our	predictors	of	interest	–	informant	(Mother	vs.	Teacher),	age	(4-	vs.	5-years-old)	and	time	(immediately	after	testimony	vs.	1-2	weeks	later).	A	multilevel	model	was	required	to	account	for	repeated	measures:	children	were	asked	about	multiple	items	at	two	time	points.	A	logistic	model	was	required	to	model	the	probability	that	children	would	categorize	an	item	based	on	the	majority	of	its	perceptual	features.	The	use	of	a	multi-level	logistic	regression	model	also	allowed	us	to	statistically	account	for	the	fact	that	children	varied	in	the	number	of	items	they	contributed	to	the	analyses	(i.e.,	they	varied	in	the	number	of	item	they	had	initially	categorized	according	to	the	majority	of	the	perceptual	evidence,	which	ranged	from	2-8).		First,	we	asked	whether	the	probability	that	children	categorized	an	item	according	to	its	majority	perceptual	features	differed	immediately	after	receiving	counter-intuitive	testimony	as	compared	to	when	children	were	questioned	in	the	second	test	session.	We	regressed	whether	children	categorized	an	item	based	on	its	majority	features	on	whether	the	test	was	administered	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	versus	after	a	delay	(see	coefficient	for	Delay,	Table	1).	Additionally,	we	controlled	for	whether	the	informant	was	identified	as	a	mother	versus	as	a	teacher	(see	coefficient	for	Teacher,	Table	1)	and	for	whether	children	were	4-years	versus	5-years	of	age	(see	coefficient	for	5-year-olds,	Table	1).		We	display	the	results	of	
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this	regression	in	Table	1,	Model	1.	We	report	results	using	odds-ratios.	Post-hoc	analyses	are	General	Linear	Hypothesis	(GLH)	tests.	Thus,	the	coefficient	on	Time	represents	the	ratio	of	the	odds	that	a	child	categorized	an	item	based	on	its	majority	features	after	a	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	A	significant	coefficient	below	1.00	would	indicate	a	lower	probability	of	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	majority	feature	after	a	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	By	contrast,	a	significant	coefficient	above	1.00	would	indicate	a	higher	probability	of	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	majority	feature	after	a	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	Inspection	of	Table	1,	Model	1	confirms	that	children	were	significantly	less	likely	to	categorize	an	item	using	its	majority	perceptual	features	immediately	after	receiving	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	than	when	they	were	tested	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks.		Thus,	children	were	less	swayed	by	the	informant’s	testimony	and	more	receptive	to	the	hybrid’s	perceptual	features	at	the	second	test	session.	Given	that	children	were	less	likely	to	categorize	items	based	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	after	a	delay,	we	asked	whether	this	waning	effect	of	testimony	was	moderated	by	the	source	of	the	testimony.	Thus,	we	added	the	interaction	between	the	timing	of	children’s	judgments	(immediate	vs.	delay)	and	whether	the	informant	was	identified	as	a	mother	or	a	teacher	(see	coefficient	for	Delay	x	Teacher,	Table	1,	Model	2).	This	interaction	was	statistically	significant.	We	illustrate	this	interaction	in	Figure	1.
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Table	1		
Study	1.	Multi-level	logistic	regression	model	comparing	the	probability	that	Chinese	children	will	categorize	an	item	based	on	the	
majority	of	its	perceptual	features			
	 Model	1	 Model	2	
		 Odds-Ratio	 z-scores	 95%	CI	 Odds-Ratio	 z-score	 95%	CI	
Delay	(1-2	weeks)	 	2.76***		 4.70	 1.81,	4.21	 4.25***	 4.62	 2.30,	7.87	
Teacher	 .82	 -.91	 .54,	1.25	 1.34	 .89	 .70,	2.54	
5-years-old	 .86	 -.40	 .42,	1.78	 .86	 -.39	 .41,	1.80	
Delay	x	Teacher		 								 	 	 .43*	 -1.98	 .19,	.99	
Constant	 .27***	 -4.57	 .15,	.47	 .21***	 -4.84	 .11,	.39	
Random-Effects	Variance	 1.00	 1.21	
Interclass	Correlation		 .23	 .24	
X2	 22.90***	 26.54***	
Model	df	 3	 4	
-2	Log	Likelihood	 597.14	 593.20		
Note.	n	=	528;	groups	=	48.		*	p	<	.05,	***	p	<	.001.			
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Figure	1.	Probability	of	a	Chinese	child	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	perceptual	features	rather	than	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	she	received	from	an	informant	identified	as	a	mother	(grey	bars)	or	identified	as	a	teacher	(black	bars)	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	and	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks	(Table	1,	Model	2).	Error	bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals.				 	
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Children	were	equally	unlikely	to	categorize	an	item	according	to	its	majority	perceptual	features	immediately	after	receiving	counter-perceptual	testimony	whether	they	received	that	testimony	from	the	teacher	or	the	mother.	However,	1-2	weeks	later,	children	were	significantly	more	likely	to	categorize	an	item	according	to	the	majority	of	its	perceptual	features	if	they	had	received	counter-perceptual	testimony	from	the	mother	rather	than	from	the	teacher.	To	further	explore	this	interaction,	we	compared	the	probability	that	children	relied	on	the	majority	perceptual	features	of	the	item	against	a	probability	of	50%.	This	allowed	us	to	test	whether	children	were:	(i)	more	likely	to	rely	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	than	on	the	items’	perceptual	features;	(ii)	equally	likely	to	use	these	two	sources	of	evidence;	OR	(iii)	more	likely	to	rely	on	the	items’	perceptual	features	than	the	counter-perceptual	testimony.	For	items	for	which	children	received	testimony	from	the	mother,	children	were	more	likely	to	rely	on	her	testimony	than	on	the	item’s	features	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	30.92,	p	<	.001)	but	were	equally	likely	to	use	both	sources	of	evidence	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	.54,	p	=	.46).	For	items	for	which	children	received	testimony	from	the	teacher,	children	were	more	likely	to	rely	on	her	testimony	than	on	the	items’	features	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	23.36,	p	<	.001)	and	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	8.29,	p	<	.001).	Thus,	over	time,	when	children	received	testimony	from	the	mother	they	partially	reverted	to	their	initial	categorization	of	these	items	based	on	their	majority	perceptual	features.	By	contrast,	when	children	received	testimony	from	the	teacher,	they	remained	likely	to	endorse	that	testimony	at	both	time	points.	
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Finally,	the	effect	of	timing	on	children’s	judgment	was	not	moderated	by	children’s	age	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	1.21,	p	=	.27)	and	we	did	not	find	a	three-way	interaction	between	the	timing	of	children’s	judgment,	their	age,	and	the	identity	of	the	informant	(GLH	Test:	c2(3)	=	5.72,	p	=	.13).	Thus,	the	two-way	interaction	of	timing	and	identity	was	not	moderated	by	age.			
Interim	Discussion	Study	1A	demonstrated	that	counter-perceptual	testimony	continues	to	influence	children’s	belief	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks	and	that	this	longer-term	influence	is	moderated	by	the	source	of	that	testimony.	In	Study	1B,	we	ask	whether	the	moderating	effect	of	informant	type	on	children’s	categorization	at	retest	is	also	present	in	the	United	States	where	preschool	teachers	hold	more	child-centered	rather	than	teacher-directed	pedagogical	beliefs	(Wang	et	al.,	2008).	In	addition,	we	extend	our	investigation	of	the	fading	effects	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	over	time	by	retesting	approximately	half	of	the	children	within	roughly	1-2	weeks	and	retesting	others	within	roughly	3-6	week.		
Study	2	
Participants	We	recruited	a	total	of	71	children	from	three	preschools	in	Boston,	United	Stated	(36	girls;	M	age	=	4.81	years,	Range	=	3.48	–	5.94).	As	in	Study	1,	we	divided	these	children	into	two	age	groups	for	analytic	purposes:	4-year-old	children	(n	=	42,	20	girls;	M	age	=	4.42	years,	Range	=	3.48	–	5.00)	and	5-year-old	children	(n	=	29,	16	girls;	M	age	=	5.39	years,	Range	=	5.01	–	5.94).	We	obtained	a	relatively	diverse	sample.	Parents	reported	having	completed:	some	high	school	(13%),	high	school	
24 
(14%),	some	college	(13%),	college	(22%),	graduate	school	(34%),	and	did	not	report	(4%).	Children	were	described	by	their	parents	as	White	(39%),	Hispanic	(38%),	Black	(7%),	Asian	(3%),	and	other	(13%).	The	surveys	were	completed	by	the	children’s	mothers	(87%),	fathers	(6%),	or	unspecified	(8%).	Eight	additional	children	were	recruited	but	were	not	included	in	our	analyses	because	they	did	not	complete	the	follow-up	testing	session.	
Procedure	The	procedure	was	identical	to	the	one	used	in	Study	1.	Children	were	randomly	assigned	to	be	retested	either	1-2	weeks	later	(n	=	33;	M	=	8	days,	Range:	4-16,	SD	=	3)	or	3-6	weeks	later	(n	=	38;	M	=	34	days,	Range:	20-44,	SD	=	8).	Therewas	no	difference	in	the	age	of	children	who	were	retested	within	1-2	weeks	(M	=	4.89,	SD=	.65)	and	those	who	were	retested	within	3-6	weeks	(M	=	4.75,	SD=	.58),	
t(69)	=	.97.	As	with	Study	1,	we	conducted	pilot	testing	with	the	hybrids	to	create	two	equivalent	sets	(Appendix	B).	
Results	As	with	Study	1,	we	restricted	our	analyses	to	the	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	features	of	the	hybrids.	As	expected,	children	were	initially	likely	to	categorize	entities	in	terms	of	the	majority	of	their	visible	features:	5.37	items	out	of	8	items	(SD	=	1.47,	Range	=	3	to	8),	a	number	significantly	above	chance	(i.e.,	4.00),	t(70)	=	19.34,	p	<.001.	A	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	the	number	of	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	of	the	entities’	visible	features	with	the	within-subject	factor	of	Informant	(2:	Mother	vs.	Teacher)	and	the	between-subjects	factor	of	Age	(2:	4-	vs.	5-years-old)	revealed	no	
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significant	effect	of	Informant,	F(1,	77)	=	.99,	no	effect	of	Age,	F(1,	77)	=	.05,	and	no	interaction	between	Informant	and	Age,	F(1,	77)	=	.17.	Thus,	irrespective	of	age	and	no	matter	which	informant	the	experimenter	proceeded	to	consult,	children	were	initially	prone	to	base	their	categorization	of	the	hybrids	on	the	majority	of	their	perceptual	features.	Using	the	same	coding	scheme	outlined	in	Study	1,	we	coded	children’s	category-based	inferences	immediately	following	the	informant’s	testimony	(e.g.,	“Do	you	think	this	animal	barks	or	meows?”),	and	their	category	labels	when	they	were	re-questioned	in	the	second	test	session	(e.g.,	“Do	you	think	this	is	a	cat	or	a	dog?”),	restricting	analysis	to	the	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	features	of	the	hybrids	(which	ranged	from	3-8).	We	also	used	the	same	analytic	method	–multilevel	logistic	regression.		First,	we	asked	whether	the	probability	that	a	child	categorized	an	item	according	to	its	majority	perceptual	features	increased	the	more	time	passed	between	children’s	receipt	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	and	their	categorization	of	the	items.	That	is,	we	tested	whether	children	were	more	likely	to	categorize	an	item	based	on	its	perceptual	characteristics	(rather	than	on	the	testimony	they	received)	when	they	were	retested	3-6	weeks	later	rather	than	1-2	weeks	later,	and	more	likely	to	do	so	when	tested	1-2	weeks	later	rather	than	immediately	after	receiving	counter-intuitive	testimony.	Accordingly,	we	regressed	whether	children	categorized	an	item	based	on	its	majority	features	on	whether	the	test	was	administered	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	versus	after	a	shorter	delay	(see	coefficient	for	Shorter	Delay,	Table	2)	and	whether	it	was	administered	
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immediately	after	receiving	testimony	versus	after	a	longer	delay	(see	coefficient	for	Longer	Delay,	Table	2).	Additionally,	we	accounted	for	whether	the	informant	was	identified	as	a	mother	versus	as	a	teacher	(see	coefficient	for	Teacher,	Table	2)	and	for	whether	children	were	4-years-old	versus	5-years-old	(see	coefficient	for	5-years-old,	Table	2).		We	display	the	results	of	this	regression	in	Table	2.	We	report	results	using	odds-ratios.	Post-hoc	analyses	GLH	tests.	The	first	coefficient	of	interest	is	the	value	and	statistical	significance	of	the	difference	between	being	tested	immediately	after	receiving	counter-perceptual	testimony	versus	being	tested	after	a	shorter	delay	of	1-2	weeks	(see	coefficients	for	Short	Delay,	Table	2).	A	significant	coefficient	below	1.00	would	indicate	a	lower	probability	of	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	majority	perceptual	features	after	a	short	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	By	contrast,	a	significant	coefficient	above	1.00	would	indicate	a	higher	probability	of	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	majority	perceptual	features	after	a	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	Other	coefficients	of	interest	are	those	for	being	tested	immediately	after	receiving	counter-perceptual	testimony	versus	being	tested	after	a	delay	of	3-6	weeks	(see	coefficients	for	Longer	Delay,	Table	2).	Again,	a	significant	coefficient	below	1.00	would	indicate	a	lower	probability	of	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	majority	feature	after	a	longer	delay	versus	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	By	contrast,	a	significant	coefficient	above	1.00	would	indicate	a	higher	probability.		Inspection	of	Table	2	reveals	that	children	were	significantly	less	likely	to	categorize	an	item	using	its	majority	perceptual	features	immediately	after	
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receiving	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	than	when	they	were	tested	after	either	a	short	delay	or	a	longer	delay.	Note	that	the	latter	coefficient	is	much	larger	than	the	former,	indicating	that	children	were	more	likely	to	categorize	the	items	in	terms	of	their	perceptual	features	after	a	delay	of	3-6	weeks	than	after	a	delay	of	1-2	weeks.	Indeed,	a	GLH	test	confirmed	this	interpretation,	c2(1)	=	11.17,	p	<	.001.	We	illustrate	this	pattern	of	results	in	Figure	2.				Table	2		
	
Study	2.	Multi-level	logistic	regression	model	comparing	the	probability	that	U.S.	
children	will	categorize	an	item	based	on	the	majority	of	its	perceptual			
	 Model	1	
		 Odds-Ratio	 z-score	 95%	CI	
Shorter	Delay	(1-2	weeks)	 	1.79*	 2.06	 1.03,	3.12	
Longer	Delay		(3-6	weeks)	 6.33***	 4.75	 2.96,	13.55	
Teacher	 .89	 -.78	 .65,	1.20	
5-years-old	 1.02	 .04	 .51,	2.03	
Constant	 .36**	 -2.86	 .17,	72	
Random-Effects	Variance	 1.58	
Interclass	Correlation		 .32	
X2	 23.33***	
Model	df	 4	
-2	Log	Likelihood	 1050.42		
Note.	n	=	969;	groups	=	71.		*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01,	***	p	<	.001.							
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Figure	2.	Probability	of	a	U.S.	child	categorizing	an	item	based	on	its	perceptual	features	rather	than	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	she	received	from	an	informant	identified	as	a	mother	(grey	bars)	or	identified	as	a	teacher	(black	bars)	immediately	after	receiving	testimony	and	after	a	short	delay	of	either	1-2	weeks	or	a	longer	delay	of	3-6	weeks.	Error	bars	represent	95%	confidence	intervals.			 	
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In	contrast	to	the	pattern	observed	in	Study	1,	the	effect	of	timing	on	children’s	judgment	was	not	moderated	by	the	informant	(GLH	test:	c2(2)	=	2.25,	p	=	.32).	Consistent	with	the	pattern	observed	in	Study	1,	the	effect	of	timing	on	children’s	judgment	was	not	moderated	by	children’s	age	(GLH	test:	c2(2)	=	2.93,	p	=	.23).	In	addition,	the	three-way	interaction	between	the	timing	of	children’s	judgment,	their	age,	and	the	identity	of	the	informant	was	not	statistically	significant	(GLH	test:	c2(2)	=	4.97,	p	=	.08).		To	further	explore	the	pattern	displayed	in	Figure	2,	we	compared	the	probability	that	children	relied	on	the	majority	perceptual	features	of	the	item	against	a	probability	of	50%.	As	in	Study	1,	this	allowed	us	to	test	whether	children	were:	(i)	more	likely	to	rely	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	than	on	the	items’	perceptual	features;	(ii)	equally	likely	to	use	these	two	sources	of	evidence;	or	(iii)	more	likely	to	use	the	perceptual	features	of	the	item	than	the	counter-perceptual	testimony.	At	each	time	point,	children	categorized	items	in	a	similar	manner	whether	they	received	testimony	from	the	informant	identified	as	a	mother	or	as	a	teacher.	Thus,	at	each	time	point	the	tests	were	conducted	on	the	average	probability	of	classifying	an	item	according	to	its	perceptual	features	(collapsing	across	informant).	When	children	classified	items	immediately	after	receiving	counter-testimony	they	were	more	likely	to	rely	on	that	testimony	than	on	the	items’	features	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	12.20,	p	<	.001).	When	children	classified	items	after	a	short	delay	of	1-2	weeks,	they	were	equally	likely	to	use	both	sources	of	evidence	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	2.85,	p	=	.09).	Finally,	when	children	classified	items	after	a	longer	delay	of	3-6	weeks,	they	were	more	likely	to	rely	on	the	item’s	
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features	than	on	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	they	received	(GLH	Test:	c2(1)	=	10.67,	p	<	.001).	In	sum,	over	time,	children	partially	reverted	to	their	initial	categorization	of	items	based	on	their	majority	perceptual	features,	and	the	greater	the	amount	of	time	between	the	receipt	of	testimony	and	the	retest	the	more	children	reverted	to	their	initial	perceptually-based	intuitions.		
Discussion	Across	two	studies,	we	examined	whether	the	effect	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs	is	short-lived	or	long-lasting	and	whether	such	effects	can	be	found	in	two	different	socio-cultural	contexts.	We	presented	children	from	China	and	the	U.S.	with	pictures	of	hybrid	entities	whose	perceptual	features	originated	from	two	animals	or	from	two	objects	(75%	of	one	and	25%	of	the	other)	and	asked	children	to	categorize	them.	For	each	hybrid,	children	then	received	testimony	(from	an	informant	identified	as	either	a	teacher	or	a	mother)	that	conflicted	with	the	categories	children	had	selected.	We	came	back	later	–	1-2	weeks	later	in	Study	1;	and	either	1-2	weeks	or	3-6	weeks	later	in	Study	2	–	and	we	asked	children	to	categorize	the	hybrids	again.	We	focused	our	analyses	on	items	that	children	initially	categorized	based	on	the	majority	of	their	perceptual	features	(i.e.,	items	for	which	they	received	testimony	that	countered	their	initial	beliefs	and	the	perceptual	evidence).	American	and	Chinese	children	categorized	fewer	items	according	to	their	majority	features	immediately	after	receiving	testimony.	This	effect	persisted	but	it	but	faded	over	time	–	it	was	somewhat	weakened	but	still	strong	by	1-2	weeks,	but	the	effect	had	almost	completely	disappeared	by	3-6	weeks.	Thus,	with	time,	children	increasingly	reverted	to	categorizing	the	hybrids	
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according	to	their	majority	perceptual	features.	In	addition,	in	the	Chinese	sample,	but	not	in	the	U.S.	sample,	the	long-term	effect	of	the	testimony	was	moderated	by	the	informant.	In	the	Chinese	sample,	children	reverted	to	their	initial	perceptually-based	categorization	of	the	hybrid	more	often	when	they	had	received	testimony	from	the	mother	rather	than	the	teacher.		Children	in	both	China	and	the	U.S.	frequently	deferred	to	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	they	received.	Thus,	in	both	cultural	settings,	children	were	unlikely	to	draw	inferences	based	on	the	perceptual	evidence	immediately	following	counter-perceptual	testimony,	a	finding	that	is	consistent	with	prior	research	(e.g.,	Chan	&	Tardif,	2013;	Gelman	&	Markman,	1986;	1987;	Jaswal	et	al.,	2009).	It	is	noteworthy	that	children	in	our	study	deferred	to	the	informant’s	counter-perceptual	testimony	slightly	more	often	than	in	Jaswal’s	(2004)	study	using	the	same	hybrids.	In	that	study,	4-year-olds	made	inferences	based	on	the	majority	characteristics	of	59%	of	the	hybrids	when	the	experimenter	presented	a	counter-perceptual	label	as	compared	to	19%	in	Study	1	and	25%	in	Study	2.	One	explanation	for	children’s	greater	deference	in	the	present	study	is	that	children	received	testimony	from	informants	with	familiar	social	roles	–	a	teacher	and	a	mother,	rather	than	from	an	informant	with	no	designated	social	role.	This	may	have	increased	children’s	willingness	to	defer	in	our	study	because	preschoolers	are	likely	to	conceptualize	both	teachers	and	mothers	as	knowledgeable	and	trustworthy	informants.	Indeed,	children	are	more	likely	to	accept	counter-intuitive	claims	when	provided	with	testimony	by	informants	who	are	more	knowledgeable	(Lane	&	Harris,	2015).	This	speculation	receives	support	from	a	study	by	Chan	and	
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Tardif	(2013),	who	also	used	an	informant	identified	as	a	“teacher”	and	found	that	U.S.	preschoolers	deferred	about	75%	of	the	time	–	a	rate	similar	to	what	we	found.		The	counter-perceptual	testimony	that	children	received	had	a	persistent	influence.	When	they	were	retested	1-2	weeks	later,	children	still	categorized	fewer	hybrids	based	on	the	perceptual	evidence	than	they	had	done	prior	to	receiving	counter-testimony	–	although	they	made	more	perception-based	categorizations	than	they	had	immediately	following	the	testimony.	When	children	(both	in	China	and	the	U.S.)	were	retested	after	a	1-2	week	delay,	they	were	equally	likely	to	classify	the	hybrids	based	on	the	testimony	they	received	and	on	their	majority	perceptual	features.	One	could	argue	that	such	divided	performance	at	retest	means	that	children	were	guessing	rather	than	still	being	influenced	by	the	counter-perceptual	testimony.	However,	even	this	conservative	interpretation	suggests	a	strong	impact	of	counter-perceptual	testimony	because	it	implies	that,	even	after	a	delay,	children	continued	to	be	skeptical	about	the	physical	evidence	they	had	initially	trusted.	An	additional	objection	to	our	claim	that	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	had	a	lasting	influence	is	that	the	experimenter	was	the	same	for	both	testing	sessions.	Thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	children	at	the	follow-up	test	simply	responded	with	what	they	thought	the	experimenter	wanted	to	hear	or	that	children	simply	learned	that	the	counter-intuitive	labels	should	be	used	in	the	presence	of	the	experimenter.	However,	this	seems	unlikely	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	experimenter	never	gave	feedback	to	the	children	and	the	experimenter	was	not	the	one	who	provided	children	with	the	testimony.	It	is	therefore	unclear	how	children	would	infer	that	the	experimenter	preferred	one	label	or	another.	Second,	at	least	in	
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the	Chinese	sample,	the	long	term	effect	of	the	testimony	differed	depending	on	the	informant	who	provided	the	testimony.	If	children	were	making	categorization	decisions	to	please	the	experimenter,	it	is	unclear	why	they	would	have	selectively	endorsed	more	counter-perceptual	labels	provided	by	the	informant	identified	as	a	teacher	rather	than	a	mother.		Thus,	an	important	implication	of	the	two	studies	is	that	a	single	exposure	to	counter-perceptual	testimony	from	an	adult	is	enough	to	shift	some	of	children’s	beliefs	over	time.	Nevertheless,	the	effect	of	testimony	did	weaken	in	that	children	reverted	to	their	initial,	perceptually-based	judgments	the	more	time	transpired	between	the	receipt	of	testimony	and	retest.	By	implication,	complete	acceptance	of	counter-perceptual	claims	may	require	repeated	exposure	from	a	single	informant	or	a	single	exposure	from	multiple	informants	to	prevent	children’s	beliefs	from	reverting	to	their	initial	beliefs	–	at	least	when	those	beliefs	can	be	reactivated	by	perceptual	evidence.		Admittedly,	children	were	provided	testimony	that	was	only	somewhat	counter-perceptual—e.g.,	the	cat-dog	contained	features	of	both	animals	and	thus	the	counter-testimony	mapped-on	to	at	least	25%	of	that	animal’s	visible	features.	It	remains	to	be	seen	how	long-lasting	children’s	beliefs	would	be	following	dramatically	counter-perceptual	testimony;	for	example,	when	taught	that	an	animal	or	object	is	completely	different	from	what	it	appears	to	be	(e.g.,	Lane	et	al.,	2014).	We	found	that	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	from	the	informant	identified	as	a	teacher	was	longer-lasting	than	the	testimony	from	the	informant	
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identified	as	a	mother	in	the	Chinese	sample	but	not	in	the	U.S.	sample.	When	retested,	Chinese	children	were	more	likely	to	continue	to	endorse	the	counter-perceptual	testimony	if	it	had	been	provided	by	the	informant	identified	as	a	teacher	rather	than	by	the	informant	identified	as	a	mother.	No	such	effect	was	found	in	the	American	sample.	This	pattern	of	results	is	consistent	with	the	research	reviewed	in	the	introduction	regarding	differences	in	Chinese	and	American	teachers’	pedagogical	beliefs	and	in	cultural	differences	in	deference	to	authority.		However,	we	did	not	measure	children’s	conception	of	the	knowledge	and	authority	of	the	informants.	Accordingly,	this	explanation	should	be	regarded	as	tentative;	more	research	is	needed	to	establish	it	securely.	Nonetheless,	in	combination	with	the	results	from	Sabbagh	and	Shafman	(2009),	our	results	suggest	that	future	research	on	selective	trust	might	benefit	from	the	inclusion	of	immediate	and	delayed	tests	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	differences	between	informants	become	apparent	over	time	even	if	they	do	not	emerge	immediately.	Such	delayed	effects	may	be	especially	likely	to	emerge	when	children	receive	counter-testimony	from	informants	who	greatly	differ	in	their	expertise	(see	Mills,	2013).	In	such	cases,	children’s	perceptions	and	prior	intuitions	may	act	as	a	magnet	'pulling'	children	away	from	the	testimony	they	have	received	and,	in	the	process,	revealing	differences	in	the	strength	of	children’s	encoding	of	that	testimony	based	on	informant	characteristics.	In	the	present	study,	it	was	not	possible	for	children	to	gather	further	evidence	to	check	the	counter-perceptual	claim	that	the	informant	had	made.	For	example,	children	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	ask	someone	else	to	corroborate	the	claim	that	the	informant	had	made;	nor	could	they	make	further	observations	of	
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the	pictured	items	to	check	on	the	properties	they	had	inferred.	However,	outside	of	the	laboratory	children	may	seek	such	additional	evidence.	Future	research	might	examine	the	extent	to	which	children	seek	additional	confirming	or	disconfirming	evidence	and	whether	such	information	gathering	moderates	the	impact	of	a	claim	over	the	long-term.		In	conclusion,	we	found	that	young	children	raised	in	two	different	cultural	contexts	display	a	robust	and	powerful	ability	to	learn	from	the	testimony	of	other	people,	even	when	that	testimony	conflicts	with	their	perceptions.	The	impact	of	such	testimony	on	children’s	beliefs	persists	a	while,	but	slowly	fades	with	time.	 
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Study 2: American children’s search for evidence following claims that contradict 
their intuitions	
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To learn about the world, children can gather first-hand evidence based on their 
own observations or they can tap into the accumulated knowledge of other people by 
listening to what other people tell them. When learning about the distant past, about 
remote places, or about hidden causal processes, children cannot easily gather first-hand 
evidence and must typically rely on the testimony provided by other people (Harris & 
Koenig, 2006). Indeed, preschool children are ready to trust what they are told in these 
various domains (Harris, 2012; Harris & Koenig, 2006).  
However, children do not believe everything they are told. They typically reject 
claims that directly contradict what they know or what they see (Clément, Koenig, & 
Harris, 2004; Jaswal, 2004; Koenig & Echols, 2003; Lane, Harris, Gelman, Wellman, 
2014; Pea, 1982; Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999; Robinson, Mitchell, & Nye, 
1995). For example, 16-month-old infants produce the correct labels for objects even 
after being given incorrect ones (Koenig & Echols, 2003); and 3- to 5-year-old children 
will reject an incorrect claim about an object’s color even from a previously reliable 
informant (Clément et al., 2004).  
Children are willing to endorse an informant’s counter-intuitive claim if their 
first-hand observations leave open the possibility that the informant might be correct. For 
example, children are more willing to make inferences about an object or animal based 
on an informant’s counter-intuitive claim when it has more features consistent with the 
informant’s claim and fewer features supporting children’s initial judgment (Bernard, 
Harris, Terrier, & Clément, 2015). Children’s appreciation of the distinction between 
reality and appearance also influences their willingness to endorse counter-intuitive 
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claims. Children who have a firm grasp of this distinction are more likely to endorse an 
informant’s unexpected claims about the true identity of the object, e.g., to accept that an 
object is really a bar of soap even though it looks like a rock (Lane et al., 2014). Thus, 
children recognize that their initial, perception-based conclusions might not be right 
especially when some of the empirical evidence points in a different direction or if they 
readily grasp how reality might not match appearance (Lane & Harris, 2014). 
However, when children verbally endorse or reject a counter-intuitive claim, they 
may continue to have doubts about that claim. Preschoolers might endorse a counter-
intuitive claim but hold on to their intuition that it is wrong. Alternatively, children might 
overtly reject a counter-intuitive claim but privately wonder whether it is actually correct. 
In either case, such uncertainty might lead children to seek additional evidence. 
Indeed, infants and preschoolers seek further evidence when they observe events 
that are counter-intuitive (Legare, 2014; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2010; Stahl & 
Feigenson, 2015; Schulz, 2012). Thus, it is plausible that children will seek further 
evidence following a claim that is counter-intuitive. Moreover, if children do gather 
evidence and this evidence conflicts with what they have been told, they might question 
their interlocutor in the hope that she can resolve the conflict (Frazier, Gelman, & 
Wellman, 2009). In sum, counter-intuitive testimony may set in motion a process of 
inquiry that culminates in children’s longer-term acceptance or rejection of what they 
were told based on the evidence they collect and on their discussion of this evidence with 
their informant.    
In this study, we explore the possibility that: (1) preschoolers will seek empirical 
evidence to check an adult’s counter-intuitive claim and (2) that preschoolers who do 
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seek evidence will question their interlocutor about any discrepancy between the 
testimony they received and the empirical evidence that they gather.  
We presented children ranging from 3- to 6-years-old with three different-sized 
Russian dolls for visual inspection. We first asked children to say which dolls they 
thought were the heaviest and lightest. We expected that almost all children would infer 
the doll’s weight based on their size (i.e., biggest = heaviest) because infants as young as 
9-month-old expect bigger objects to be heavier (Mounoud & Bower, 1974). Next, the 
experimenter told children that the smallest doll was actually the heaviest (a claim that 
was, in fact, false) and then re-questioned children about the dolls’ relative weight.  To 
find out if children would seek empirical evidence to test such a counter-intuitive claim, 
the experimenter excused himself from the room, thereby giving children an opportunity 
to resolve any apparent conflict between the visible size of the dolls and the 
experimenter’s claim—by picking them up. Finally, to assess whether children’s search 
for evidence would lead them to report back to the experimenter about the difference 
between his claim and the felt weight of the dolls, we also gave children an opportunity 
to talk with him upon his return and coded these responses. We hypothesized that older 
children would be more likely to endorse the counter-intuitive claim of the informant but 
also more likely to test it by picking up the dolls. We made this prediction because we 
expected that older children’s greater appreciation of the difference between reality and 
appearance (e.g., Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1986) would lead them to have more doubts 
about the apparent weight of the dolls – doubts that would increase both their acceptance 
of the experimenter’s claims as well as their search for evidence.  
Method 
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Participants 
We recruited 70 children ranging from 3 years and 6 months to 6 years and 3 
months at three Boston area preschools that also ran afterschool programs for 
kindergarten and first grade students (32 girls; M age = 4 years and 11 months, SD = 8 
month). For analytic purposes we divided children into three age groups in one year-
increments: 3-year-old children (n = 18; 7 girls; M age = 4 years, 0 months, Range: 3 
years, 6 months – 4 years, 6 months), 4-year-old children (n = 33; 17 girls; M age = 5 
years, 0 months, Range: 4 years, 6 months – 5 years, 6 months), and 5-year-old children 
(n = 19; 8 girls; M age = 5 years, 9 months, Range: 5 years, 6 months – 6 years, 3 months). 
We asked parents to report on their level of education and on their child’s ethnicity. 
These data confirmed that we obtained a relatively diverse sample on each dimension.  
Parents reported having attended: high school (26%), college (36%), and graduate school 
(38%). Children were described by their parents as White (46%), Hispanic (30%), Black 
(9%), Asian (3%), and other (12%). Two additional children were tested but were not 
included because their initial judgments of the weight of the dolls did not match the 
intuition that biggest = heaviest.  
Materials  
Three Russian dolls (that had been repainted and were therefore not recognizable 
as Russian dolls) were used. The largest doll was green (4 x 5.5 inches), the smallest doll 
was white (1 x 1.75 inches), and the intermediate doll was black (3 x 4 inches).   
Procedure 
Children were tested in a separate room in each preschool. Children completed 
five phases in a fixed order: initial judgment, counter-intuitive testimony, second 
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judgment, opportunity to gather evidence, opportunity to talk to the experimenter. Initial 
Judgment. The three dolls were placed in front of the child. The experimenter then asked 
children to point to the heaviest doll and to the lightest doll: “Can you point to the one 
that is the heaviest?”, “Can you point to the one that is the lightest?” Counter-Intuitive 
testimony. The experimenter told children: “Actually, this one (the smallest doll) is the 
heaviest and this one (the largest doll) is the lightest”. Second judgment. Children were 
asked to point to the heaviest doll and to the lightest doll. In addition, they were asked to 
make an inference about which of the two dolls would be harder to lift: “Would it be 
harder for someone to pick up this object [pointing to the biggest one] or this object 
[pointing to the smallest one]?” Opportunity to gather evidence. The experimenter told 
children that he was going to write down some notes but that he would leave the dolls on 
the table. He walked outside and returned after 45s. A confederate in the room who had 
been reading a newspaper and had not interacted with the child (he was already reading 
the newspaper when children arrived in the room) recorded whether children picked up 
one of the dolls as well as which dolls they picked up. Opportunity to talk to the 
experimenter. Once the experimenter returned, he told children: “We’re done! Is there 
anything you want to tell me before we go back to the classroom?”  This gave children an 
opportunity to tell the experimenter whether they picked up the dolls and if so, what they 
discovered 
Results 
 We first examine children’s judgments about the weight of the dolls before and 
after the experimenter’s counter-intuitive claim. We then examine whether children 
sought evidence (i.e., whether they picked up the dolls or not) and, finally, whether they 
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reported the discrepancy between the experimenter’s testimony and the felt weight of the 
dolls to the experimenter on his return.  
Children’s judgments about the weight of the dolls 
Before hearing the experimenter’s unexpected claim, children were asked to 
identify which doll was the heaviest and which one was the lightest. All children who 
identified the biggest doll as the heaviest and the smallest doll as the lightest (70 out of 
72) were retained in the study. After being told by the experimenter that the smallest doll
was actually the heaviest, children were asked three further questions about the weight of 
the dolls (i.e., they were asked to point to the heaviest and the lightest doll and they were 
also asked which of the two indicated dolls would be harder to pick up). Only a minority 
of children held steadfast to their initial judgment that biggest = heaviest for all three 
questions (n = 13, 18.57%). The remaining children either completely endorsed (3 
questions out of 3; n = 32, 45.71%) or partially endorsed (1 or 2 questions out of 3; n = 
25, 35.71%) the testimony of the experimenter. To evaluate the effect of the counter-
intuitive testimony on children’s judgments, we calculated for each child the proportion 
of questions for which they stated that biggest = heaviest before receiving testimony, M = 
1.00 SD = 0.00, and after receiving testimony, M = .35 SD = .38. A Wilcoxon Signed-
Ranks Test confirmed that children’s judgments changed significantly following the 
receipt of counter-intuitive testimony, Z = 7.12, p < 0.001. To investigate whether the 
proportion of questions for which children stated that biggest = heaviest after receiving 
testimony was related to their age, we conducted a test for trend across ordered groups 
(nptrend command in Stata 14). We found that older children were marginally more 
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willing than younger children to set aside their initial intuitions and endorse the 
experimenter’s counter-intuitive testimony, z = 1.90, p = .058 (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of judgments consistent with biggest = heaviest for 3-, 4-, and 5-
year-old children before testimony and after testimony.  
 
Children’s search for evidence following testimony 
 After children had judged the weight of the dolls, the experimenter stated that he 
was going to leave to write down some notes but that he would leave the dolls on the 
table. The confederate then discreetly recorded whether children picked up the dolls and 
if so which dolls. We used this information to measure whether children sought evidence. 
Children were only given credit for picking up both of the two dolls that they had 
received testimony about (i.e., the biggest and the smallest doll). We considered children 
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to have gathered evidence if they picked up these two dolls because in so doing they 
could test the counterintuitive testimony they had been given. Overall, 26% (18 of 70) of 
children picked up both dolls. Whether children sought evidence following the receipt of 
counterintuitive testimony was unrelated to their prior endorsement of the experimenter’s 
testimony: 31% (10 of 32) of children who completely endorsed the testimony, 20% (5 of 
25) of children who partially endorsed the testimony, and 23% (3 of 13) of children who 
held steadfast to their initial judgments picked up both dolls, χ2(2, N=70) = 0.99, p = 
0.61. 
Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the percentage of children seeking evidence 
increased with age.  Specifically, more 5-year-olds sought evidence than 3-year-olds, 
χ2(1, n=37) = 4.50, p < 0.05, V = .35, although there was no significant difference 
between 4-year-old and 5-year-old children, χ2(1, n=52) = 1.81, p = .18, or between 
between 3- and 4-year-old children, χ2(1, n=51) = 1.27, p = 0.26. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children who sought evidence by picking 
up the smallest and the biggest doll.  
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Children’s engagement with the experimenter on his return 
 After the experimenter returned, he asked children whether there was anything 
that they wanted to tell him before returning to their classroom. Children’s responses 
were coded by a research assistant blind to the study’s goals and hypotheses and by the 
first author into 3 mutually exclusive categories (inter-rater agreement = 97%, 
disagreements were resolved through discussion). Did not talk to the experimenter about 
the dolls (71%); this category included children who either did not say anything to the 
experimenter or who talked about an unrelated subject (e.g., “my shirt is green and this 
(doll) is green”). Sought an explanation or permission to pick up the dolls (5%); this 
category included children who asked the experimenter to offer an explanation for the 
testimony he had provided (e.g., “Why is the white the littlest but the heaviest?”) or who 
asked for permission or picked up the dolls after the experimenter asked whether the 
child wanted to say anything. Commented on the weight of the dolls (24%); this category 
included children who stated or implied that the experimenter had provided incorrect 
information about the weight of the largest and smallest doll (e.g., “You were tricking 
me, this was the heaviest one” “This one is the heaviest, I think (pointing to the largest 
doll)”, “None of them are really heavy, they are all light”.  
In Figure 3, we display the percentage of children coded into each category as a 
function of whether or not they sought evidence. Figure 3 depicts a strong association 
between whether children sought evidence and tendency to comment on the weight of the 
dolls, Fisher’s Exact Test, two sided, p < 0.001. Almost all of the children who did not 
pick up either doll failed to talk about the dolls on the experimenter’s return. By contrast, 
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the majority of children who picked up both dolls commented on their weight upon the 
experimenter’s return (72%).  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of children who commented on the weight of the dolls, sought an 
explanation or permission to pick up the dolls, or did not talk to the experimenter about 
the dolls upon the experimenter’s return as a function of whether or not they sought 
evidence.   
 
Discussion 
We showed children three different-sized Russian dolls and asked them which 
dolls they thought were the heaviest and the lightest. We then provided them with an 
unexpected (and incorrect) claim about the weight of two dolls and checked whether they 
would endorse or reject this claim. We then gave children an opportunity to empirically 
test the experimenter’s claim by lifting the dolls in his absence and an opportunity to 
discuss what they had discovered with the experimenter on his return.  At the outset of 
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the experiment, prior to having any opportunity to lift the dolls, almost all children 
inferred their relative weight from their size; they judged that the biggest doll was the 
heaviest and that the smallest doll was the lightest.  Despite this near-universal intuition, 
many children subsequently endorsed the contrary claim of the experimenter namely that 
the smallest doll was the heaviest. Indeed, older children were more prone to such 
endorsement than younger children. Nevertheless, the later behavior of some children 
indicated that, irrespective of their endorsement or denial, they were still thinking about 
the conflict between the appearance of the dolls and the experimenter’s claim. Once the 
experimenter had left, a sizable minority of children – especially older children – picked 
up the two dolls they had received testimony about.  Having done so, they often 
commented on the results of their investigation to the experimenter when he returned. 
This pattern of findings indicates that some children will seek evidence for an unexpected 
claim and query an informant on the basis of the evidence that they gather. We consider 
each of these findings in turn before discussing implications for future research.   
Why were children so unanimous in their initial judgment that the biggest doll 
was the heaviest and yet so willing to agree with the experimenter’s claim that the 
smallest doll was the heaviest? A plausible explanation of children’s initial, unanimous, 
judgment is that they frequently observe a positive correlation between size and weight. 
Indeed, infants 9 months and older expect bigger objects to be heavier. They exert more 
force when lifting a bigger than a smaller object (Mounoud & Bower, 1974). However, 
even if children expect bigger objects to be heavier they are likely to have discovered that 
the correlation is imperfect, particularly as they gather more first-hand experience with 
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bigger but lighter objects. Indeed, older children tended to endorse the counter-intuitive 
claim of the experimenter more than younger children.  
Following the experimenter’s departure, children were left in the room with the 
dolls to consider two conflicting pieces of evidence: (i) the visible difference in the size 
and apparent weight of the dolls; and (ii) the experimenter's contrary claim. Why were 
older children more likely to seek evidence to resolve this conflict than younger children? 
Two explanations are plausible. First, older children may have experienced greater 
conflict than younger children between the two sources of evidence. Older children’s 
greater appreciation that height and weight do not always co-vary might have 
simultaneously reduced their confidence in the perceptual evidence while increasing the 
plausibility of the experimenter’s testimony. Younger children on the other hand might 
have placed greater weight on the perceptual evidence than on the testimony and thus 
experienced less conflict between these two sources of evidence.  
A second and more speculative explanation for older children’s somewhat greater 
acceptance of the testimony as well as their greater propensity to seek more evidence 
following that testimony is that they were better than younger children at generating a 
reason why the testimony might be true (e.g., that the smallest doll was made up of a 
heavier material than the biggest doll). An explanation for a counterintuitive claim makes 
that claim more plausible and also provides a way to falsify that claim if the explanation 
includes a testable mechanism (e.g., one of the dolls is hollow while the other has 
something inside it). Indeed, there is evidence that the kind of explanations children 
provide in response to conflicting evidence predicts their engagement in hypothesis 
testing behaviors (Legare, 2012) and that older children are better able to imagine 
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circumstances that would allow for the possibility of improbable (counterintuitive) events 
than younger children (Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007; Lane, Ronfard, 
Francioli, & Harris, 2016). 
Children’s subsequent willingness to report back to the experimenter about the 
weight of the dolls co-varied systematically with the amount of evidence they had 
gathered. Children almost never reported back to the experimenter if they had not picked 
up both dolls whereas they very often reported back to the experimenter if they did. By 
implication, if children collected evidence they became more confident about their initial, 
perception-based assessment of the dolls’ relative weight and this prompted them to 
revisit the topic with the experimenter on his return. Children may have chosen to 
comment on the dolls’ weight for two reasons: as a means of obtaining additional 
information from the experimenter about the dolls’ weight or to correct the 
experimenter’s mistaken belief about their weight. One way to discern children’s motive 
would be to have the experimenter respond by restating his claim that the smallest doll is 
the heaviest. If children were seeking additional information, they would be likely to ask 
for an explanation from the experimenter. However, if children were correcting the 
experimenter, they would be likely to reaffirm their disagreement and perhaps encourage 
the experimenter to pick up the dolls himself.  
We have argued that children’s picking up of the two dolls was a search for 
evidence. However, it is conceivable that children picked up one or more of the dolls not 
to resolve the conflict between their apparent weight and what the experimenter had said, 
but out of idle curiosity – they simply wanted to investigate the dolls. Because we did not 
include a control condition in which children heard a claim that confirmed their intuition 
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about the weight of the dolls, we cannot completely rule out this possibility. However, 
this proposal offers no obvious explanation for the age change in children’s examination 
of the dolls because there is no reason to expect that older children would have more 
curiosity about them than younger children. Moreover, the fact that children 
spontaneously commented on the weight of the dolls almost exclusively after they had 
picked them up strongly suggests that children were seeking evidence to resolve an 
apparent conflict rather than examining the dolls out of idle curiosity.  
 Our design placed a reasonable amount of social pressure on children to endorse 
the experimenter’s testimony. Children were asked to make a second judgment about the 
dolls’ weight immediately after receiving counter-testimony by the person who provided 
them with that testimony. This differs from other paradigms where children are presented 
with counter-perceptual or counter-intuitive testimony on video rather than in person and 
are not asked to make evaluative judgements by the same person who provided them with 
the testimony (e.g., Bernard et al., 2015; Lane et al., 2014). This additional pressure to 
comply may have increased children’s propensity to endorse the testimony. In addition, 
we did not explicitly encourage children to seek out evidence when the experimenter left 
the room. This may have reduced children’s propensity to test the experimenter’s claim 
because children may have felt that they could not explore the dolls in his absence. Our 
experiment might therefore provide a conservative test of children’s willingness to seek 
evidence following testimony.  
The fact that our experimental design may have increased children’s propensity to 
publicly endorse the testimony they received and reduced their exploration of the dolls 
might account for the lack of a relationship between children’s endorsement of the 
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experimenter’s testimony and their search for evidence. Reducing incentives for children 
to agree with the experimenter and cueing children to seek evidence upon the 
experimenter’s departure from the room by using subtle or more explicit prompts might 
help clarify the relationship between public endorsement of testimony and children’s 
skepticism as demonstrated by their search for evidence. Under such conditions, children 
who hold steadfast to their initial beliefs or completely endorse the testimony they 
subsequently receive might be less likely to seek evidence than children who are more 
uncertain.   
Recent research has highlighted the tension between learning from instruction and 
autonomous exploration. Instruction appears to restrict exploration by reducing the 
number of hypotheses children consider (e.g., Shafto, Goodman, & Frank, 2012). For 
example, two-year-olds who received instruction engaged in less exploration of a toy and 
discovered fewer novel functions than children who received no instruction (Bonawitz et 
al., 2011; Shneidman, Gweon, Schulz, & Woodward, 2016). However, the present 
findings suggest that this inhibiting effect of instruction on exploration may be restricted 
to cases where children have no strong intuitions about the topic of instruction. In fact, 
our results imply that instruction can increase exploration if it conflicts with children’s 
initial intuitions. Increased exploration following counter-intuitive claims may play an 
important role in children’s acquisition of improbable and counter-intuitive phenomena.  
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Study 3: Chinese children’s search for evidence following claims that 
contradict their intuitions 
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 Study 3 was intended to build on Study 2 and added needed controls. In Study 3, 
we assigned children to receive confirming or counter-intuitive testimony. This allowed 
us to assess whether children’s exploration changed as a result of receiving counter-
intuitive testimony. We also assigned children to receive a small prompt or no prompt to 
explore the dolls before the experimenter left the room. This allowed us to assess whether 
children, especially those who were younger, explored less because they did not feel 
comfortable doing so or because they did not think additional exploration was needed. 
We videotaped children’s exploration of the dolls rather than having a second 
experimenter in the room to further reduce any inhibitions children might have felt to 
explore the dolls. Finally, we asked children to make additional judgements about the 
weight of the dolls. We asked them to make a judgment of the dolls’ weight when the 
experimenter returned to the room. This allowed us to see whether children changed their 
mind about the weight of the dolls as a result of their exploration of the dolls. We also 
asked children to make additional judgements about the weight of the dolls with a second 
experimenter who was not present during the first part of the experiment. We reasoned 
that children would feel less pressure to continue to endorse the experimenter’s testimony 
if they interacted with a second experimenter who was naïve about the testimony children 
had received about the dolls. By comparing children’s responses to the questions posed 
by the first and the second experimenter, we could assess whether children were reluctant 
to contradict the first experimenter’s testimony in her presence. Finally, we asked 
children to provide explanations for their judgements to better understand how children 
used the testimony and the evidence they gathered to judge the weight of the dolls. 
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To learn about the distant past, about remote places, or about hidden causal 
processes, children must typically rely on others’ testimony (Harris & Koenig, 2006). A 
considerable body of evidence has shown that children are ready to trust what they are 
told in these various domains (Harris, 2012). Indeed, they often do so even when what 
they are told contradicts their intuitions (Lane & Harris, 2014). Children typically cannot 
gather empirical evidence to confirm or disconfirm what an adult has told them. For 
example, they cannot easily gather evidence about long departed civilizations or extinct 
animals. In such cases, it is reasonable for children to accept what they have been told. 
However, there are cases where children can test an adult’s counter-intuitive claim 
especially when they are learning about scientific topics. For example, if presented with 
similarly sized cubes and told that some will float and others will sink, children can easily 
test the adult’s claim and through their experimentation learn about the role of density. 
Presented with a counter-intuitive claim that is easy to test, do young children seize such 
opportunities or do they simply acquiesce to what they have been told?  
One possibility is that young children will seek empirical evidence when 
presented with a counter-intuitive claim that is easily testable. After all, infants seek 
empirical evidence after observing counter-intuitive phenomena (Stahl & Feigenson, 
2015) and preschoolers also seek evidence when faced with confounded (Schulz & 
Bonawitz, 2007) or theory-violating evidence (Van Schijndel, Visser, Van Bers, & 
Raijmakers, 2015). However, an alternative possibility is that preschoolers will not seek 
evidence following an adult’s claim even if it is counter-intuitive and easily tested. 
Preschoolers display a robust bias to trust what other people tell them. They are willing to 
trust information from a previously inaccurate or misleading adult – even one who has 
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misled them multiple time (Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010; Krogh-Jespersen & 
Echols, 2012; Vanderbilt, Heyman, & Liu, 2014) and even when what they are told 
conflicts with what they have just seen (Jaswal, 2010). This bias to trust adult testimony 
is especially strong in younger children (Jaswal et al., 2014). Hence, younger children 
may not seek evidence following a counter-intuitive claim even if older children do so. 
To assess these two hypotheses, we presented preschool and elementary school 
children with five, different-sized, Russian dolls for visual inspection. We first asked 
children to say which doll was the heaviest. We expected almost all children to infer the 
dolls’ weight based on their size (i.e., biggest = heaviest) because infants as young as 9-
month-old expect bigger objects to be heavier (Mounoud & Bower, 1974). Next, the 
experimenter made an assertion that either confirmed their initial belief (i.e., biggest = 
heaviest) or contradicted it (i.e., smallest = heaviest, a claim that was, in fact, false). 
Children were then re-questioned about the dolls’ relative weight. Next, the experimenter 
excused herself from the room, thereby giving children an opportunity to resolve any 
apparent conflict between the visible size of the dolls and the experimenter’s claim – by 
lifting them. By comparing children’s exploration of the dolls across the two conditions, 
we could assess the impact of counter-intuitive versus confirming testimony on children’s 
exploration. To assess whether children’s exploration would prompt them to report back 
to the experimenter, we also gave them an opportunity to talk with her upon her return.  
Following the opportunity to explore the dolls, the experimenter again asked 
children about their relative weight. E1 then left the room and was replaced by a second 
experimenter (E2). When E2 entered the room, she expressed interest in the dolls and 
said she had not seen them before. She then asked children about their weight, both 
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directly (i.e., “Which one do you think is the heaviest?) and indirectly (i.e., Which would 
make the best paperweight?”). By examining these three post-exploration judgments, we 
could assess the influence of children’s exploration on their subsequent judgments when 
they were questioned by the adult who had made the counter-intuitive or confirming 
claim about the dolls and also by an adult apparently uninformed about them.  
Method 
 
Participants 
 We recruited a total of 200 children from one preschool and from one elementary 
school in Shenzhen, China (101 boys; M age = 6.11 years, Range = 3.25 – 8.00). The two 
schools serve a similar population and are located in the same neighborhood (across the 
street from one another). We randomly assigned preschool and elementary school 
children to one of four conditions: counter-intuitive testimony, counter-intuitive 
testimony with prompt, confirming testimony, confirming testimony with prompt (see 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). An a priori power analysis informed by a pilot study 
determined that we needed a minimum of 37 children in each Age Group X Testimony 
condition to have .8 power to detect a 35% difference in children’s exploration across the 
two testimony conditions in each age group. We tested more children than we had 
originally planned because of better-than-hoped-for recruitment. 
We obtained a relatively diverse sample. Parents reported on the level of 
education they and their partner (if applicable) had completed (196 out of 200, or 98% of 
parents answered this question) and on their income level (176 out of 200, or 88% of 
parents answered this question). Parents reported: no exposure to college (13%; i.e., 
neither parent had attended college), some exposure to college (24%; i.e., at least one 
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parent had attended college), completed college (63%; i.e., at least one parent had 
completed college). Parents reported having: a higher-income level (6.21%), a middle-
income level (87.01%), and a lower-income level (6.21%). The surveys were completed 
by mothers (75.5%), fathers (22%), or were unspecified (0.50%). Thirty-one additional 
children were recruited but not included in our analyses because of equipment failure (n = 
20) or because children failed to identify the largest doll as the heaviest in their initial 
judgment (n = 11).  
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Table 1.  
 
 
Sample descriptive statistics by condition.  
 
 Counter-Intuitive Testimony Confirming Testimony 
 Prompt No Prompt Prompt No Prompt 
Preschool 
N = 18, 10 female 
M = 4.74, SD = 1.03  
Range = 3.42 to 6.25 
N = 20, 9 female 
M = 4.49, SD =.93 
Range =3.25 to 6.42 
N = 22, 9 female 
M = 4.74, SD =.89  
Range = 3.33 to 6.25 
N = 21, 13 female 
M = 4.58, SD =1.00  
Range = 3.33 to 6.33 
Elementary School 
N = 31, 17 female 
M = 7.10, SD = .47  
Range = 6.36 to 7.87 
N = 27, 12 female 
M = 7.18, SD =.43  
Range = 6.12 to 7.86 
N = 31, 17 female 
M = 7.11, SD = .42 
Range = 6.34 to 8.00 
N = 30, 12 female 
M = 7.07, SD = .40 
Range = 6.09 to 7.90 
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Materials  
 We used five different-sized Russian dolls; each doll was attached to a square 
base for stability. With the square base attached, the dolls weighed: 16.32 g, 29.04 g, 
46.75 g, 85.82 g, and 167.73 g. The dolls and their bases were painted white.  They were 
arranged on a tray placed on the table so that the biggest doll was on the child’s left and 
the smallest one was on the child’s right (Figure 1). The experimenter and the child sat 
next to each other at the table. The dolls were approximately 18” from the table edge 
nearest to the child. The experimental session was discreetly recorded using a laptop 
camera with a darkened screen. None of the children made any comments about the 
laptop or behaved as if they knew they were being filmed. 
 
 60 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in the experiment 
 
 
Procedure 
Children were individually tested in a separate room at their school by a female 
Chinese experimenter fluent in Mandarin. The experimental procedure consisted of eight 
phases: (i) initial judgment with E1; (ii) testimony (counter-intuitive or confirming, 
depending on condition); (iii) post-testimony judgment; (iv) opportunity to explore the 
dolls (prompt or no prompt depending on condition); (v) opportunity to talk to the 
experimenter; (vi) final judgment with E1; (vii) initial judgment with E2; and (viii) 
paperweight selection with E2. A brief description of each phase follows. 
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Initial Judgment with E1. The experimenter asked children to point to the heaviest 
doll: “Which doll do you think is the heaviest?” Children were then asked to provide an 
open-ended explanation: “You think this one is the heaviest – why do you think it is the 
heaviest?”  
Testimony. Children were randomly assigned to receive counter-intuitive 
testimony (i.e., smallest = heaviest) or testimony that confirmed their intuition (i.e., 
biggest = heaviest). In the counter-intuitive testimony condition, the experimenter told 
children: “Actually, that one is not the heaviest; this one here (pointing to the smallest 
one on the right) is the heaviest. It’s heavier than all of the other ones. It’s heavier than 
this one, this one, this one, this one (starting with the biggest one and moving to the 
second smallest one).”  In the confirming testimony condition, the experimenter told 
children: “Yes, that one is the heaviest, and this one here (pointing to the smallest one on 
the right) is the lightest. This one (pointing to the biggest one) is heavier than all of the 
other ones. It’s heavier than this one, this one, this one, and this one (starting with the 
next to biggest one and moving to the smallest one)”.  
Post-testimony judgment. Children were again asked to identify the heaviest doll 
and to provide an explanation for their judgment using the same wording as for the initial 
judgment. Children were also asked to recall which doll the experimenter had identified 
as the heaviest: “Can you point to the one I said was the heaviest?” Of the 200 children 
tested, 186 (93%) correctly pointed to the doll indicated by the experimenter.  
Opportunity to explore the dolls. The experimenter then told children that she was 
going next door to pick up the phone for a moment but that she would come right back. 
For children assigned to the prompt condition, she added: “I’ll move the dolls a bit closer 
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to you” and pushed the tray so that the dolls were about 6 inches from the child. She then 
walked out of the room, returning after 1 minute had elapsed.  
Opportunity to talk to the experimenter. Once the experimenter returned, she said, 
“Let’s see—we were talking about the dolls” and paused for 10 seconds to offer children 
an opportunity to initiate a conversation with her following their opportunity to explore 
the dolls. If children did not spontaneously talk to her, she prompted children: “Okay, 
we’re almost done. Is there anything you want to tell me?”  
Final judgment with E1. Children were asked to identify the heaviest doll and to 
provide an explanation for their judgment using the same wording as the initial judgment. 
E1 then stated: “We’re almost done, can you wait in this room and somebody will come 
to take you back to the classroom.” She left the room and went to get E2, a different 
female experimenter. She did not return to the room but E2 entered the room. Note that 
the child had not yet met E2 who had remained in another room for the first part of the 
experiment.  
Initial judgment with E2. E2 entered the room and exclaimed: “Whoa! I like these 
dolls. I've never played with them before! I wonder which one is the heaviest? Can you 
tell me?” E2 then asked for an explanation by saying: “Why do you think that one is the 
heaviest?”  
Paperweight selection with E2. E2 then stated: “Hey—these dolls give me an 
idea! I think one of these dolls would be good to stop my papers from blowing away—
especially if it’s heavy (E2 puts a pile of papers on the table). Can you point to the doll 
you think is best to stop the papers from blowing away?” After the child made a choice, 
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E2 asked for an explanation: “Why do you think that one is best to stop the papers from 
blowing away?” 
Coding  
The first author and a research assistant blind to the hypotheses of the study coded 
25% of the total number of explanations children provided and 25% of the videos for 
children’s exploration of the doll. Both coders were blind to children’s age, condition, 
and judgments about the dolls. Agreement was 95% for the explanations and 100% for 
the exploration of the dolls. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. The 
research assistant coded the remaining explanations and videos. 
Results 
We analyze children’s: (i) initial and post-testimony weight judgments; (ii) 
exploration of the dolls; (iii) post-exploration remarks to the experimenter; (iv) post-
exploration weight judgments; (v) and post-exploration weight judgments as a function of 
children’s exploration. We report results for logistic regression models using odds-ratios. 
All logistic analyses were conducted using the –logit– command in Stata 14.  
Children’s initial and post-testimony weight judgments  
 In Table 2, we display the proportion of children who stated that the biggest doll 
was the heaviest when they were initially asked and immediately after they had heard the 
experimenter’s confirming or counter-intuitive testimony. All children initially stated that 
the biggest doll was the heaviest. Note, however, that this unanimous pattern reflects the 
fact that we excluded the very small minority of children (N = 11, i.e., 5.5%) who did not 
initially select the biggest doll as the heaviest. Inspection of Table 1 shows that the 
proportion of children who claimed that biggest = heaviest decreased sharply in both age 
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groups immediately after counter-intuitive testimony, McNemar tests < .0001, but not 
after confirming testimony, McNemar tests > .25. Children who received counter-
intuitive testimony endorsed the biggest doll as the heaviest significantly less often than 
children who received confirming testimony, c2(1, N = 200) = 141.42, p < .001, Cramér’s 
V = .88. In sum, the type of testimony markedly affected children’s judgments of the 
doll’s weight. 
Table 2. Percentage of children who claimed that the biggest doll was the heaviest. 
Initial 
Judgment 
Following 
Testimony 
Confirming 
Preschool 100% 93% 
Elementary 100% 97% 
Counter 
Preschool 100% 13% 
Elementary 100% 10% 
We coded children’s explanations following their initial and post-testimony 
judgments. Explanations were coded as: Bigger = Heavier if children described a 
positive association between size and weight (e.g., “It’s the largest so it’s the heaviest”); 
as Smaller = Heavier if they described a negative association between size and weight 
(e.g., “It’s small so it’s the heaviest) or referred to being told that the smallest was the 
heaviest (e.g., “Because you told me”); as Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight if they 
described why the biggest doll might not be the heaviest (e.g., “The largest one is hollow, 
while the smallest one is solid”). Finally, explanations were coded as Other if they could 
not be coded into the other four categories (e.g., “It’s the heaviest”, “It’s very heavy, as 
heavy as four water bottles”, “It is just right”) or if children did not provide an 
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explanation. Table 3 shows the percentage of each type of explanation as a function of 
age, testimony type, and timing.  
Table 3. Percentage of preschool and elementary school children’s explanations coded 
into each category as a function of Testimony Type (Confirming vs. Counter-Intuitive), 
and Timing (Before vs. After Testimony). 
Explanation Type 
Confirming 
Testimony 
Counter-Intuitive 
Testimony 
Before After Before After 
Preschool Children 
Other 28% 24% 24% 37% 
Bigger = Heavier 79% 72% 76% 8% 
Smaller = Heavier 0% 0% 0% 52% 
Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight 0% 0% 0% 3% 
Elementary School Children 
Other 0% 7% 0% 10% 
Bigger = Heavier 100% 82% 100% 0% 
Smaller = Heavier 0% 2% 0% 50% 
Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight 0% 10% 0% 40% 
Both age groups mostly offered Bigger = Heavier explanations (e.g., “It’s the 
largest so it’s the heaviest”) before and after confirming testimony. By contrast, both age 
groups mostly offered Bigger = Heavier explanations before but rarely after counter-
intuitive testimony. Children who endorsed the experimenter’s counter-intuitive claim 
justified their decision either by repeating the experimenter’s claim (i.e., Smaller = 
Heavier) or by noting that size and weight are not always correlated (i.e., Size is 
Sometimes Unrelated to Weight, 47%). The latter explanation was common among 
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elementary school children (40%) but was rare among preschool children (3%). Thus, 
although preschool and elementary school children endorsed the counter-intuitive 
testimony of the experimenter at similar rates, they often did so for different reasons. 
Children’s exploration of the dolls 
We coded whether children touched any of the dolls, and if they did, whether they 
gathered evidence that could confirm or disconfirm the experimenter’s claim, i.e., 
whether or not they lifted the smallest and the biggest doll during the experimenter’s 
absence. We further distinguished between children who picked up the smallest and the 
biggest doll separately and those children who picked them up concurrently, i.e., picked 
up the smallest doll in one hand and the biggest doll in the other. 
Our analytic strategy for these two measures was to first introduce our main 
predictors of interest, Age Group (Elementary vs. Preschool), Type of Testimony 
(Counter-Intuitive vs. Confirming), Prompt (Prompt vs. no Prompt) before testing for 
interaction effects.  
Table 3 displays parameter estimates for a logistic regression model predicting 
whether children touched any of the dolls. All coefficients are in odds-ratios. For 
example, the coefficient for Counter-Intuitive Testimony is the ratio of the odds that a 
child touched any of the dolls after having received counter-intuitive rather than 
confirming testimony.  
A significant interaction between Age Group and Prompt emerged, as displayed 
in Figure 2. We used General Linear Hypothesis (GLH) tests to interpret this interaction. 
Preschoolers were as likely to touch the dolls whether they did or did not receive a 
prompt, GLH Test: c2(1) = .27, p > .25. In contrast, elementary school children were 
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more likely to touch the dolls when they had received a prompt, GLH Test: c2(1) = 5.72, 
p = .017. Elementary school children were more likely to touch the dolls than preschool 
children in the no prompt condition, GLH Test: c2(1) = 3.89, p = .049, and this was 
especially true in the prompt condition, GLH Test: c2(1) = 17.89, p < .001. There were no 
further interactions or main effect. Thus, older children touched the dolls more often than 
younger children especially when they were given a prompt to do so by the experimenter. 
Importantly, younger and older children’s touching of the dolls was not related to the 
type of testimony they received. A similar proportion of children touched the dolls 
whether they received confirming or counter-intuitive testimony.  
Figure 2. Proportion of preschool and elementary school children who touched the dolls 
while E1 was out of the room as a function of the testimony and prompting they received 
prior to E1’s departure.  
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Table 3. Logistic regression model comparing whether children touched the dolls as a 
function of the type of testimony children received, whether they received a prompt, and 
their age.  
Model 2 
Odds-Ratios z scores 95% CI 
Counter-Intuitive Testimony 1.43 1.03 .72, 2.83 
Elementary 2.42* 1.97 1.00, 5.85 
Prompt .79 .52 .33, 1.91 
Elementary X Prompt 5.39* 2.23 1.22, 23.66 
Constant 1.19 .48 .59, 2.40 
X2 30.50*** 
Model df 4 
-2 Log Likelihood 200.79 
* p < .05; ** p = .011; *** p < .001. Note. n = 200.
We now turn to children’s targeted exploration of the dolls (i.e., whether they 
picked up the smallest and the biggest doll). Table 4 displays parameter estimates for a 
logistic regression model predicting whether children picked up the biggest and the 
smallest doll.  
A significant interaction between Age Group and Testimony Type emerged, as 
displayed in Figure 3. Preschoolers’ exploration did not differ by type of testimony (GLH 
Test: c2(1) = .06, p = .80). However, significantly more elementary school children 
explored following counter-intuitive than confirming testimony (GLH Test: c2(1) = 
11.79, p < .001). Thus, more elementary school children than preschool children explored 
following counter-intuitive testimony (GLH Test: c2(1) = 21.96, p < .001) whereas there 
was no significant age difference in exploration following confirming testimony (GLH 
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Test: c2(1) = 2.89, p = .09). There were no further interactions. This same pattern 
emerged when we focused on the subset of children who had picked up the biggest and 
the smallest doll at the same time (See Appendix C). 
In summary, counter-intuitive testimony provoked elementary school children to 
compare the biggest and smallest dolls. Indeed, they engaged in such exploration whether 
or not they were prompted to do so by E1’s placement of the dolls. This effect of counter-
intuitive testimony was not observed among preschool children. Children’s decision to 
explore was unrelated to whether they had endorsed or rejected the experimenter’s 
testimony or to the type of explanation they had provided following their endorsement or 
rejection of the experimenter’s claim (See Appendix D). 
Figure 3. Proportion of children receiving confirming vs. counter-intuitive testimony who 
picked up the biggest and the smallest doll while E1 was out of the room.  
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Table 4. Logistic regression model comparing whether children picked up the biggest and 
smallest dolls as a function of the type of testimony children received, whether they 
received a prompt, and their age.  
Model 2 
Odds-Ratios z scores 95% CI 
Counter-Intuitive Testimony .89 .25 .36, 2.22 
Elementary 2.00 1.70 .90, 4.46 
Prompt 1.43 1.15 .78, 2.64 
Counter-Intuitive X Elementary 5.20** 2.55 1.47, 18.43 
Constant .05* 1.99 .24, .99 
X2 36.35*** 
Model df 4 
-2 Log Likelihood 238.48 
* p < .05; ** p = .011; *** p < .001. Note. n = 200.
 Post-exploration remarks to the experimenter 
Following the return of E1, some children stated or implied that the biggest doll 
was indeed the heaviest (e.g., “The smallest doll is the lightest”; “I know which doll is 
the heaviest! (pointing to the largest one). I have picked up all of the dolls”).  Although 
rare, these assertions displayed a similar pattern to children’s doll exploration. 
Preschoolers seldom made them following either type of testimony (2 vs. 2, one sided 
Binomial Test, p > .25) whereas elementary school children made them more often 
following counter-intuitive as compared to confirming testimony (9 vs. 2, one sided 
Binomial Test, p = .033). 
Post-exploration weight judgments  
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Children made a judgment about the weight of the dolls: (1) immediately after the 
opportunity to explore the dolls; (ii) when explicitly asked by E2; and (iii) when invited 
by E2 to select the heaviest paperweight. Preliminary analyses showed that children’s 
judgments remained stable across these three successive time points (Appendix E). 
Accordingly, we summed the three judgments to reflect how often children asserted that 
biggest = heaviest. Children’s scores were analyzed via a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with Age 
Group (2: Preschool, Elementary), Prompting (2: Prompt, No Prompt), and Testimony 
Type (2: Confirming, Counter-Intuitive) as between-subject factors.  
This analysis revealed significant main effects of Testimony Type, F(1,192) = 
99.46, p < .001, η2 = .33, and Age Group, F(1,192) = 5.16, p = .024, η2 = .017. There 
were no other significant main effects or interaction effects. Thus, the interaction of 
Testimony Type X Age Group fell short of significance, F(1,192) = 2.03, p = .16, η2 = 
.007. Nevertheless, we explored the simple effect of age for each type of testimony given 
the aforementioned age-related differences in children’s exploration of dolls. In Figure 4, 
we display the frequency with which children said that the biggest doll was the heaviest 
as a function of Age Group and Testimony Type. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that 
preschool and elementary school children who received confirming testimony made 
similar judgments, p < .25. In contrast, in the counter-intuitive condition, elementary 
school children judged that the biggest doll was the heaviest more often than younger 
children, p = .011. 
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Figure 4. Average number of times preschool and elementary school children judged that 
the biggest doll was the heaviest as a function of the type of testimony they received. 
Error bars represent +/- 2 standard errors.  
Post-exploration weight judgments as a function of children’s exploration 
To investigate the influence of exploration on children’s post-exploration weight 
judgments, we analyzed these judgments via a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with Age Group (2: 
Preschool, Elementary), Prompting (2: Prompt, No Prompt), and Exploration (2: 
Explored, Did Not Explore) as between-subject factors, restricting our analysis to 
children who had received counter-intuitive testimony.  
This analysis revealed only a significant main effect of Exploration, F(1,88) = 
20.91, p < .001, η2 = .18: Children who had explored judged the biggest doll to be the 
heaviest much more often than children who had not explored. We display this main 
effect in Figure 5. Children who did not explore the dolls, endorsed the smallest doll as 
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the heaviest significantly above chance, t(33) = 4.42, p < 0.001, d = 1.54. In contrast, 
children who did explore the dolls, endorsed the biggest doll as the heaviest significantly 
above chance, t(61) = 2.77, p < 0.01, d = .71. Thus, when children gathered empirical 
evidence it undermined the earlier impact of the experimenter’ counter-intuitive 
testimony on their judgments.  The absence of any interaction between age and 
exploration, F(1,88) = .26, p > .25, indicates that exploration, when it occurred, shifted 
the judgments of preschool and elementary school children to the same extent, as shown 
in Figure 3. 
Figure 5. Average number of times preschool and elementary children judged that the 
biggest doll was the heaviest as a function of whether they explored the doll. Error bars 
represent +/- 2 standard errors. 
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We asked whether children seek empirical evidence following an experimenter’s 
testable claim. Preschool children rarely did so whether the claim matched their intuitions 
or conflicted with them. By contrast, elementary school children did seek empirical 
evidence, especially when the claim was counter-intuitive. Indeed, we found that it was 
children’s targeted exploration of the dolls (i.e., picking up the biggest and the smallest 
doll) and not their more general engagement with any of the dolls that was influenced by 
the counter-intuitive nature of the testimony. In addition, we replicated this same age-
change using a still more focused measure of children’s exploration – notably, whether 
they picked up the biggest and the smallest doll at the same time, thereby optimizing their 
opportunity to establish which doll was heavier. Our favored explanation for this age 
change is that older children are increasingly prone to adopt an empirical stance in 
relation to counter-intuitive claims. Recognizing that such claims can be tested against 
the available evidence, they actively seek that evidence and revise their judgment of the 
unexpected claim accordingly. This interpretation is consistent with earlier findings 
showing that preschool children are surprisingly trusting of an informant’s testimony, 
even when the informant has a history of inaccuracy and even when the claim does not 
match immediately prior observations. Yet it extends those findings by showing that – 
given relevant opportunities – older children will test unexpected claims. 
Three alternative explanations for this age change received no support. First, there 
was no indication that the two age groups differed in their initial intuitions – almost all 
children in both age groups claimed that the biggest doll was the heaviest. By 
implication, children in both age groups found the experimenter’s counter-intuitive claim 
equally disconcerting. Furthermore, even though there was an age change in the way that 
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children explained their endorsement of the counter-intuitive claim – with a considerable 
proportion of older children noting that size is sometimes unrelated to weight – children’s 
mode of explanations proved to be unrelated to their pattern of exploration. Taken 
together, these findings imply that older children explored more than younger children 
because they were better able to recognize how evidence could bear on the 
experimenter’s claim and not because they found the claim more unexpected or 
interpreted it differently.  
Second, there was no indication that the two age groups varied in their ability to 
learn from empirical evidence, once it had been gathered. Recall that children in each age 
group were equally likely to maintain – in the wake of exploration – that the biggest doll 
was the heaviest (See Figure 5). By implication, the two age groups did not differ in their 
capacity to revise their judgment once empirical evidence had been gathered – rather they 
differed in their readiness to seek such evidence in the first place especially after counter-
intuitive testimony (see Figure 3). 
Third, there was no indication that younger children explored the dolls less than 
older children because they believed that such exploration was unacceptable. That is, we 
did not see an increase in younger children’s exploration when they received a prompt 
implying permission to explore the dolls in the experimenter’s absence. Recall that for 
half the children in each age group, the experimenter pushed the tray so that the dolls 
were within easy reach, saying: “I’ll move the dolls a bit closer to you.” This prompt did 
not influence younger children’s willingness to touch the dolls and it had no impact on 
younger and older children’s investigation of the dolls. In any case, preschool and 
elementary school children’s exploration differed primarily in the counter-intuitive 
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testimony condition. By implication, older children were not generally more bold or 
exploratory than younger children.  
We now consider the implications of the main finding – the age change in 
children’s exploration when given counter-intuitive testimony. This result adds an 
important twist to prior research on children’s ability to consider conflicting evidence – 
specifically, conflicts between what they see and what they are told. As outlined in the 
introduction, this line of research has shown that when presented with testimonial 
evidence that conflicts with their perceptions and intuitions, children typically resolve 
that conflict by deferring to the testimony (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; 1987). 
Indeed, children will even pass on such counter-perceptual claims to someone else 
(Jaswal, Lima, & Small, 2009). Our results make the important point that although 
children are willing to entertain and transmit counter-intuitive claims, their endorsement 
of such claims need not imply unreflective acceptance of them. Particularly among 
elementary school children, the counter-intuitive claim prompted empirical exploration.  
This result also provides a fresh perspective on the impact of instruction on 
children’s exploration. Previous research has shown that instruction restricts exploration 
by reducing the number of hypotheses that children consider (e.g., Bonawitz et al., 2011; 
Shafto, Goodman, & Frank 2012; Shneidman, Gweon, Schulz, & Woodward, 2016). Our 
results suggest, however, that for older children whether instruction limits exploration 
depends on the exact nature of what they are told. When instruction does not conflict with 
children’s intuitions about what they observe, it may lead them to focus their exploration 
on a subset of the various possibilities that they would have investigated on their own. 
This allows children to restrict their exploration in an efficient fashion. By contrast, when 
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older children are presented with information that conflicts with their intuitions, such 
information helps them to learn by prompting them to consider possibilities they would 
not have considered otherwise, thereby increasing their exploration.  
A noteworthy implication of the age change in children’s exploration following 
counter-intuitive claims is that children react differently when they observe counter-
intuitive phenomena as compared to when they hear counter-intuitive claims. Observable, 
counter-intuitive phenomena tend to provoke first-hand exploration even in infants (Stahl 
& Feigenson, 2015) whereas counter-intuitive claims are often accepted without any 
empirical investigation – at least by preschoolers. By implication, children feel a greater 
need to investigate discrepancies between what they expect and what they observe than 
between what they expect and what they are told. This selective pattern of exploration 
further highlights the privileged and potent role of intentionally communicated 
information in children’s reasoning (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  
Older children’s greater exploration following counter-intuitive rather than 
confirming testimony opens up three questions for future research. First, does this age 
change apply to children’s search for other types of claim? Children are exposed to many 
counter-intuitive claims. Some of these claims can be checked through observation or 
experimentation. Other claims cannot. When children are faced with a counter-intuitive 
claim that they cannot test, are they more likely to query trusted informants and use 
consensus among these informants to determine whether to accept or reject this claim?  
Second, is children’s exploration following a counter-intuitive claim influenced 
by the informant’s confidence in her claim? Younger children may be prone to explore 
more following counter-intuitive claims that are expressed with uncertainty rather than 
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certainty. In contrast, older children’s exploration may be primarily influenced by the 
nature of the claim – its counter-intuitive nature.  
Third, what role does culture play in shaping children’s search for information 
following counter-intuitive claims? We suspect that the age-related differences we 
observed in our Chinese sample will also be found in other cultures. This is because 
research confirming an early bias to trust testimony has mostly been conducted in the 
United States, notwithstanding the socialization of U.S. children towards independence 
rather deference (Chen & French, 2008; Markus & Kitayana, 1991). Nonetheless, 
important cultural difference may arise in children’s willingness to spontaneously report 
on their exploration – a tendency that was quite limited in the current sample of Chinse 
children. This would be an important finding because a greater willingness to report on 
inconsistent evidence may lead to more child-adult conversation about why such 
discrepancies exist.  
In sum, young children are receptive to claims that defy their perceptions and 
intuitions. This allows them to quickly acquire many beliefs and practices that they would 
not be able to learn on their own.  However, as this experiment demonstrates, as they get 
older, children increasingly seize opportunities to evaluate counter-intuitive claims 
through empirical investigation when such opportunities are available.  
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Conclusion 
 Across three studies, this dissertation explored the ability of socially-transmitted, 
counterintuitive, claims to influence children’s beliefs and whether this differed based on 
children’s cultural environment (i.e., China vs. the U.S.). We first discuss similarities 
between the Chinese and American sample before discussing differences.  
The first study asked whether the impact of receiving socially-transmitted, 
counterintuitive information on children’s beliefs was long-lasting rather short-lived. This 
study revealed that American and Chinese children are willing to consider testimony that 
conflicts with their intuitions and that this influence of testimony on their beliefs is long-
lasting. It continues to influence American and Chinese children’s beliefs two weeks after 
exposure to the testimony. However, the results also suggested that while powerful and 
long-lasting one exposure to testimony was unlikely to be enough to generate complete 
belief change. When they were retested 1-to 2-weeks later, American and Chinese 
children still categorized fewer hybrids based on the perceptual evidence than they had 
done initially – but more often than they had done immediately following counter-
perceptual testimony. By implication, sustained acceptance of counter-perceptual and 
counter-intuitive claims may require repeated exposure from a single informant or a 
single exposure from multiple informants to prevent children’s beliefs from reverting to 
their initial beliefs – at least when those beliefs can be reactivated by perceptual 
evidence.  
The second study examined whether American children’s exposure to claims that 
contradict their intuitions triggers their search for evidence. Indeed, some children, 
particularly older children, sought empirical evidence and questioned their interlocutor 
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following exposure to a counter-intuitive claim. The third study used a similar task to test 
whether Chinese children’s exposure to claims that contradict their intuitions triggers 
their search for evidence. Indeed, like American children, older Chinese children more 
often sought empirical evidence following the experimenter’s counter-intuitive claims. In 
fact, our inclusion of a confirming testimony condition showed that older children’s 
exploration increased when they received counter-intuitive rather than confirming 
testimony whereas younger children’s exploration remained the same. Thus, older 
children purposefully sought evidence following the counter-intuitive claim. In contrast, 
younger children “accidentally” encountered this evidence. In both cases, however, if 
children had explored the dolls they were now more likely to reject the experimenter’s 
counter-intuitive claim than if they had not obtained such evidence.  
In sum, converging evidence across these three studies and across two cultures 
suggests that counter-intuitive testimony may set in motion a process of inquiry that 
culminates in American and Chinese children’s longer-term acceptance or rejection of 
what they were told. That is, the evidence children uncover whether as a result of their 
deliberate search for evidence or as a result of random exploration, and their discussion 
of this evidence with others are all likely to influence what children come to believe and 
ultimately what they choose to transmit to other people.  
As the previous paragraphs make clear, there are important similarities in the 
manner in which American and Chinese preschoolers responded to the counter-perceptual 
and counter-intuitive testimony they received. We now turn to differences in American 
and Chinese preschoolers’ memory for, and search for empirical information following, 
counter-intuitive claims.  
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We found that the counter-perceptual testimony from the informant identified as a 
teacher was longer-lasting than the testimony from the informant identified as a mother in 
the Chinese sample but not in the U.S. sample. When retested, Chinese children were 
more likely to continue to endorse the counter-perceptual testimony if it had been 
provided by the informant identified as a teacher rather than by the informant identified 
as a mother. No such effect was found in the American sample. One interpretation of this 
finding is that children’s socialization influences the amount of epistemic authority they 
ascribe to a given informant based on that informant’s social role. In our case, the high 
respect placed on teachers in Chinese culture (Li, 2012) as well as parents’ desire to see 
their children succeed in school (Tobin, Hsueh, & Karasawa, 2009) may have led 
children to be particularly attentive to the testimony provided by the teacher informant. 
However, an important caveat is that we did not measure children’s conception of the 
knowledge and authority of the informants. Accordingly, more research is needed to 
secure this interpretation. Nonetheless, it suggests that cultural input about the expertise 
and authority of particular informants plays a role in children’s memory for the counter-
intuitive claims they are given.  
We found two noteworthy differences between Chinese and American children’s 
endorsement, and selective search for information following, a counter-intuitive claim 
(i.e., Study 2 vs. Study 3). These difference are somewhat difficult to interpret given 
differences in the two studies’ protocols. However, a few tentative claims can be 
advanced until a more direct comparison can be made based on identical experimental 
protocols. First, we found that American children were less likely to endorse the 
experimenter’s counter-intuitive claim than Chinese children (about 65% of the time vs. 
 82 
about 90% of the time). Secondly, while children in the U.S. and China were both more 
likely to spontaneously talk about the weight of the dolls upon the experimenter’s return 
if they had gathered empirical evidence contradicting the experimenter’s claim, children 
in the U.S. did so more frequently than children in China (72% vs. 16%). In sum, Chinese 
children more often deferred to the experimenter than the American children and were 
less likely to bring up contradictions between what the experimenter had said and what 
they discovered. These differences are all consistent with the hypothesis outlined in the 
introduction that American and Chinese children are socialized to advance their own 
beliefs differently at home and in school when these intuitions contradict the claims of 
other people. However, a comparison of American and Chinese children’s exploration of 
dolls in the experimenter’s absence suggests no difference in Chinese and American 
children’s propensity to seek evidence testing the experimenter’s claim when left alone. 
This is not entirely surprising because children in the U.S. and China may have both felt 
the need to assuage their uncertainty regarding the experimenter’s testimony albeit for 
different reasons, i.e., “was I right to trust her?” vs. “was I right not to trust her and 
instead trust myself?” 
The difference in Chinese children’s behavior relative to American children in a 
public but not a private setting is consistent with prior research findings. Chinese-
American and Chinese children are more likely to endorse counter-perceptual testimony 
provided by a consensus of multiple informants than European-American children when 
asked to make these judgments publicly (Corriveau et al., 2013; Corriveau & Harris, 
2010). However, they do not differ from their Euro-American counterparts when making 
these judgments privately (Corriveau & Harris, 2010) or when asked to transmit such 
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testimony to someone else (Chan & Tardif, 2013). Moreover, although Chinese-
American children are more likely to imitate inefficient actions than Euro-American 
children when taught by multiple models, they do not differ from Euro-American 
children when taught by a single model (DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 
2015). A plausible explanation for this collection of findings as well as our own is that 
Chinese and American-Chinese children may be more willing to consider socially 
provided counter-intuitive and counter-perceptual information in a public setting (perhaps 
as a means to minimize social conflict) even if they do not believe the testimony they 
have been given. That is, Chinese children’s greater deference likely reflects greater 
sensitivity to the social context than actual differences in beliefs.  
In sum, children are willing to endorse counterintuitive claims and their longer-
term acceptance or rejection of such claims is influenced by their subsequent discovery of 
evidence confirming or disconfirming these claims. This is true of children growing up in 
two different cultural contexts – the U.S. and China. Despite these similarities, children 
in these two countries differ in the extent to which they are willing to publicly voice 
agreement with counter-intuitive claims. In the U.S. where children are encouraged to 
voice independent opinions they are more likely to voice disagreement with such claims 
than in China where such behavior is less encouraged. Thus, the experiments reveal 
important but rather subtle differences in how children approach claims that contradict 
their perceptions and intuitions: children vary in their initial consideration of these claims 
but not necessarily in their long-term acceptance of them – acceptance being determined 
by children’s search for additional information regarding the counter-intuitive claim and 
how long they have been exposed to that claim.  
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In the sections that follow I briefly discuss the implication of these three studies 
for our understanding of children’s cognitive development. I then turn to implications for 
future research. Specifically, I discuss possible relations between children’s socio-
communicative environments, children’s propensity to seek information through 
questions, observation, and experimentation. Then, I discuss the possible role of 
executive function skills for children’s ability to learn from socially transmitted and 
empirical information. I conclude by discussing the implications of these studies for early 
childhood education.   
Implications for children’s cognitive development 
These three studies further our understanding of children’s cognitive development 
in two ways. First, Studies 1A and 1B demonstrate that the acquisition of counterintuive 
claims is a protracted process that is best understood using methods that measure 
children’s acceptance of such claims over time. Second, Studies 2 and 3 point to 
connections between children’s search for information through exploration and question-
asking –two means of acquiring information that have thus far between studied 
independently of one another.  
As children age they increasingly encounter and come to believe in claims that 
defy their first-hand perceptions and their intuitions about the world (Lane & Harris, 
2014). This dissertation advances our understanding of children’s acquisition of such 
concepts by demonstrating that coming to believe counterintuive claims is a protracted 
process that extend beyond exposure to a single claim. This conclusion should spur future 
work to move beyond measures of children’s endorsement of counter-intuitive claims to 
measures of children’s engagement with such claims over time. For example, in their 
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review of the literature on the development of children’s counterintuitive concepts, Lane 
and Harris (2015) identify a number of factors that may influence children acceptance of 
these concepts (e.g., qualities of informants, qualities of the information, qualities of the 
context). The methods used in Studies 1A and 1B, Study 2, and Study 3 provide means to 
extend our understanding of these factors. For example, Lane and Harris (2015) found 
that when presented with counterintuitive claims, children between 3- and 8-years-old 
were more trusting of claims provided by experts with relevant (as opposed to irrelevant) 
expertise. However, how strong is this influence of expertise on children’s endorsement 
of these claims? Are counterintuitive claims provided by an expert better remembered 
over time than those provided by a non-expert? Are such claims less likely to be tested by 
children if they are given the chance to do so? In other words, what is the depth of 
children’s acceptance of these claims?  
Studies 2 and 3 suggest interesting relations between children’s questioning and 
exploratory play. Developmental research has shown that infants and young children are 
motivated to understand causal relationships and will investigate following their 
observation of novel and unexpected phenomena (Schulz, 2009; Stahl & Feigenson, 
2015). Moreover, as Study 2 and 3 demonstrated, young children will also seek empirical 
evidence and discuss this evidence with an informant following the receipt of unexpected 
testimony. However, young children’s exploration of the world is not restricted to 
empirical inquiry. Children ask many questions often with the purpose of obtaining 
information. Indeed, children will generate their own explanation or request new 
explanations following the non-provision of explanations or the provision of non-
explanations (Frazier, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009). Thus, children use their observations 
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and the explanations they receive as fodder for inquiry – whether that inquiry involves 
querying the world or other people. The fact that these two modes of inquiry are triggered 
by similar antecedents (i.e., unexpected observations or unexpected claims) suggests a 
common psychological mechanism and suggests that children’s exploration and 
questioning mirror and influence each other during early childhood. However, because 
children’s physical exploration of the world and their exploration through questions have 
so far been investigated separately we do not know how these two forms of exploration 
are related and how they influence one another. For example, how do children’s early 
physical exploration and their caregiver’s response shape their propensity to seek 
additional information? This is an important goal for future research.  
Relations between children’s socio-communicative environments and children’s 
propensity to seek information 
Very little research has examined individual differences in children’s learning 
from exploration and questions. For example, Legare (2012) finds that children’s 
provision of a mechanistic (i.e., it’s broken) rather than a category-based explanation 
(i.e., it must not be a blicket) predicts children’s search for evidence following their 
observation of a broken blicket, e.g., their engagement in hypothesis testing behaviors 
such as repeatedly placing the blicket on the machine. However, Legare (2012) did not 
explore what led children to provide these different types of explanations. Similarly, 
other studies of children’s exploratory and explanatory abilities do not explore individual 
differences in children’s engagement in exploratory play and in their provision of 
explanations.  
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Differences in children’s socio-communicative environments may partially 
explain individual variation in children’s propensity to engage in empirical exploration 
and verbal questioning as well as their propensity to generate and evaluate the 
explanations they are given. That is, one way in which children’s exploration and 
questioning might be similarly influenced and might influence one another is through the 
responses that these acts of inquiry generate from caregivers. Indeed, the amount and 
kind of talk children receive varies markedly within and across social-class (Hart & 
Risley, 1992) with important implications for children’s language and cognitive 
development (Hoff & Naigles, 2002; Huttenlocher et al., 2010; Rowe, Leech, Cabrera, 
2016).  
Caregivers differ in the amount of wh-questions they produce (who, what, where, 
when, why, how) (Rowe, Coker, Pan, 2004). Parents from higher social classes ask more 
questions to their children (e.g., Farran & Haskins, 1980; Hart & Risley, 1995; Heath, 
1983; Rowe, 2008) and tend to provide more informative replies to their children’s 
questions (Corriveau, 2016). These differences in input are likely to have important 
implications for the development of children’s information seeking. For example, Tizard 
and Hughes (1984) reported that 4-year-old UK children from higher social classes asked 
more questions than their lower class peers (see also, McCarthy, 1930). However, it is 
currently unclear how children’s socio-communicative environments influence children’s 
information seeking behaviors. Seeking additional information requires children to 
identify that they need information, to formulate a question or hypothesis, and then to ask 
that question or to test that hypothesis. Each of these steps may be influenced by 
children’s socio-communicative environments.  
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First, children’s socio-communicative environments might influence children’s 
search for evidence by influencing children’s propensity to monitor their own knowledge. 
Growing up in a family that often asks for justifications may lead children to internalize 
this pattern of thought. Internalizing the need to have justifications for their beliefs may 
lead children to more often reflect on what they know and are told and this may lead 
them to more frequently identify gaps in their own knowledge and therefore to seek 
information to address these gaps. Indeed, there is great variability in children and adults’ 
propensity to engage in self-explanation (Rittle-Johnson, 2006) and engaging in self-
explanation facilitates learning (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Pine & Siegler, 2003; Wong, 
Lawson, & Keeves, 2002). Thus, one possible pathway to variability in children’s 
information seeking is that differences in the frequency with which children are asked to 
justify their beliefs (i.e. are asked justification questions or have their explanations 
corrected) lead children to monitor their understanding more closely which in turn leads 
them to seek information more often. This greater sensitivity to discrepancies in their 
own knowledge should influence both children’s questioning of people and their 
empirical investigations.  
 Second, children’s socio-communicative environments may influence their 
children’s ability to ask appropriate questions by shaping their understanding of the 
evidentiary constraints in a particular domain of knowledge. Understanding the 
boundaries of a particular domain of knowledge may help children reduce the number of 
explanations they consider and thus help them ask more pointed questions. Children’s 
explanations suggest that they understand that phenomena in different domains require 
different kinds of causal explanations. By 2.5-years-old, children spontaneously provide 
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explanations about various entities (e.g., persons, animals, objects) using different 
explanatory modes (i.e., modes that use different causal mechanisms: physical, 
psychological, social-conventional, biological). Importantly, children’s explanations pair 
entities with explanatory modes in a manner that suggests constrained yet flexible causal 
reasoning (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Wellman, Hickling, & 
Schult, 1997). For example, children explain the actions of individuals using 
psychological explanations but use physical explanations to explain an object’s 
movement. Similarly, between 5- and 9-years-old children increasingly understand 
circumstances where evidence is helpful in resolving conflicts and where it is not. 
Wainyrb and colleagues (2004) asked 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds to consider disagreements 
between two people over a matter of fact, a moral issue, an issue of taste, and an 
ambiguous causal issue. They asked children if only one or both of the individuals could 
be right in their conflicting claims. At all three age groups, children almost always said 
that only one person could be right when debating a matter of fact or a moral issue. 
However, with respect to an issue of taste or an ambiguous causal issue, children more 
often stated that both people could be right. This pattern of reasoning which was already 
presents among 5-year-olds increased in frequency among 7- and 9-years old. An 
important implication of these findings is that children understand how standards of 
evidence (i.e., the kinds of explanations and evidence that are required to adjudicate a 
claims) vary across domains – an important skill for asking appropriate questions and for 
generating and evaluating explanations.  
Children’s developing understanding of the appropriateness of causal mechanisms 
for a given domains and their understanding of the role of evidence in resolving conflicts 
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is presumably acquired through children’s exposure to, and engagement in, conversations 
and may play an important role in children’s information seeking by allowing children to 
identify the kinds of evidence that are required in different domains. That is, another 
possible pathway to variability in children’s information seeking is that children’s socio-
communicative environments shape children’s understating of the evidentiary constraints 
of different domains of knowledge and this may help children generate more specific 
questions whose answer are more likely to help them learn.  Understanding the 
evidentiary constraints of various domains is likely to be easier to observe in children’s 
questions than in their empirical investigations. Nonetheless, just as children’s’ questions 
may be more precise, children’s empirical investigations may also be more precise. For 
example, children with a better understanding of the kind of evidence required by a 
particular problem may be quicker to obtain that information (i.e., may gather it in fewer 
steps).  
Finally, children’s socio-communicative environments, particularly their 
caregivers’ positive response to their exploration and queries might nurture in children an 
expectation that seeking information from others is a good strategy for learning. This may 
in turn influence children’s decision to ask rather than keep to themselves the questions 
and explanations they have formulated. Consider a 12-month-old infant who is exploring 
puzzle blocks on her own. She turns to her mother and expresses puzzlement at where to 
place one of the puzzle pieces. Or consider the case of a 3-year-old who asks her mother 
questions about the cause of a particular event. Does the tendency of a caregiver to 
respond or ignore these expressions of uncertainty and these requests for information 
influence a child’s information seeking in later years? Moreover, does the quality of the 
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caregiver’s response matter? Thus, another possible pathway to variability in children’s 
information seeking is through children’s expectation about the usefulness of seeking 
information – an expectation based on their prior interactions with familiar caregivers. 
Children who frequently receive informative replies may be more likely to seek 
information than children who do not receive informative replies (or any replies). We 
might expect that the expectation that others will provide informative replies might 
influence the propensity of children’s verbal questions but not their independent 
empirical investigations.  
So far I have discussed three non-exclusive mechanisms through which 
differences in children’s socio-communicative environments might influence children’s 
search for information: influences on children’s self-monitoring, influences on children’s 
ability to ask targeted question, and influences on children’s expectation that they will 
receive an informative reply. These three influences are likely to exist across various 
cultures and communities. However, it is also the case that communities differ widely in 
their beliefs about how children should interact with adults (Gauvain, Munroe, & Beebe, 
2013; Heath, 1983). Specifically, many cultures expect children to be deferential and this 
may lead children to fewer questions even if children across these different cultures do 
not differ in their ability and propensity to formulate questions and explanations. Rowe 
(2008) showed that parents’ beliefs about child development influences the frequency of 
parents’ child-directed speech and in turn children’s language development. Similarly, 
parents’ beliefs about the importance of allowing children to express their own opinions 
and to ask questions rather than to be deferential may influence how parents respond to 
their children’s questions and consequently influence the development of children’s 
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information seeking through the pathways identified above. Preliminary evidence for this 
claim comes from a comparison of Study 2 and Study 3. American children very 
frequently discussed the results of their exploration with the experimenter (72%) while 
Chinese children rarely did so (16%). Given the documented cultural differences in 
deference to authority between the US and China (Chen & French, 2008; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), this suggests that children’s propensity to share what they discover 
when it conflicts with what they are taught may be shaped by their home environment. 
Additional suggestive evidence of this relationship can be inferred from Gauvain, 
Munroe and Beebe (2013)’s analysis of children’s conversations in Belize, Kenya, Nepal 
and Samoa –countries where adults expect children to be deferential. The authors found 
that children’s information-seeking questions made up about one-tenth of the remarks 
that children made, a proportion similar to that observed by Chouinard (2007) in the U.S. 
However, in these communities, unlike in the US, children very rarely asked how or why 
questions – questions one might expect following an adult’s provision of information and 
which might be interpreted as doubting or probing that explanation.  
In sum, it will be important for future work to examine how different 
manifestations of children’s search for information (i.e., their physical exploration of the 
world and their questioning) are related to and influence one another. One likely 
mechanism influencing both of these forms of information seeking is children’s socio-
communicative environment – caregivers’ propensity to provide, request, and evaluate 
explanations in their conversations with their children, a propensity that is likely to be 
rooted in parents’ tacit theories of child development and in their child development 
goals.   
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The role of executive function skills and children’s ability to learn from inquiry  
 The previous section discussed three pathways through which children’s socio-
communicative environments might influence their search for information. In this 
section, I turn to children’s ability to learn from their inquiries and specifically to the role 
that children’s executive function skills (EF) might play in this process. Executive 
functions skills refer to three sets of cognitive processes: inhibition (self-control – 
behavioral inhibition, and interference control – selective attention and cognitive 
inhibition), working memory, and cognitive flexibility (the ability to switch back and 
forth between different ways of thinking about phenomena) (Diamond, 2013). These 
three components of EF are all likely to be involved in children’s ability to learn from the 
information they gather through questions or through empirical investigations. This is 
because to learn from an explanation about phenomena or from their exploration of a 
particularly phenomenon, children must inhibit their current beliefs (cognitive inhibition), 
evaluate the extent to which a new explanation accounts for the data at hand relative to 
their prior beliefs (working memory and cognitive flexibility), and update their mental 
model of the phenomena under consideration – all skills that develop rapidly during the 
preschool years.  Indeed, recent experimental work suggests that working memory plays 
an important role in children’s ability to learn from an explanation (Bascandziev, Powell, 
Harris, & Carey, 2016). Bascandziev et al. (2016) asked children to find a ball that was 
dropped down an opaque curved tube. When asked to perform this task, two- and three-
year-old children exhibit a gravity bias. They tend to search for the ball directly below the 
place where the ball was dropped rather than at the bottom of the tube into which the ball 
was dropped. The authors found that children could overcome this bias if provided with 
94 
an explanation about the causal role of the tube in constraining the downward path of the 
ball. Importantly, children’s ability to use this explanation to make correct predictions 
about the location of the ball on future trials was predicted by higher scores on a working 
memory task, controlling for age, gender, and receptive vocabulary. This result suggests 
that while it is important to understand how children develop the ability to question the 
world and the people around them and how such abilities can be nurtured, it is equally 
important to study the factors that influence children’s ability to learn from the 
information they gather. It is possible that EF skills play an important role in children’s 
ability to generate questions and hypotheses as well as in their ability to learn from the 
information they have gathered. However, it may also be the case that EF skills plays a 
greater role in one of these two processes or that different facets of EF are important for 
generating questions, evaluating the data that are obtained as a result of these questions, 
and updating existing beliefs to incorporate these new conclusions in mental 
representations of the world. Moreover, EF skills may be particularly important when 
children are learning about concepts that contradict their everyday experiences and 
intuitions. For example, could differences in EF explain variability in children’s memory 
for the counterintuitive testimony they received in Study 1? Or for their propensity to 
seek evidence and learn from that evidence in Study 2? 
Implications for early childhood education  
The line of research pursued in this dissertation and its results have important 
implications for educational practice. They demonstrate that children are prepared to 
learn from teachers in domains where what they are taught conflicts with what they know 
or see and that such instruction is memorable – children encode this information into long 
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term memory. In addition, it appears that some children’s willingness to learn from their 
teachers is bounded –particularly in older children. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that 
some children will question what they are told by seeking evidence and discussing that 
evidence with their informant. This spontaneous exploration of instruction may be 
harnessed in schools to improve learning outcomes. Thus, an important implication of 
that finding is that instruction does not always come at the expense of children’s 
exploration and curiosity. Debates in education often center on the value of direct-
instruction versus more student centered method of instruction. However, the current 
results suggest that instruction and exploration are not enemies and may even work 
together to support students’ learning. More research needs to be done to better 
understand the conditions under which instruction and exploration interact to support 
learning. However, the current study demonstrates that direct instruction and exploration 
can be used together to promote children’s critical thinking about what they are told and 
what they discover.  
In the previous section, we discussed the possible role of children’s socio-
communicative environment in the home on the development of their information 
seeking skills. If children’s socio-communicative environment at home influences their 
development so must the socio-communicative environment of their schools. Children 
spend a lot of time in schools and, as a result, schools play an important role in children’s 
development. Unfortunately, not much discussion occurs in classroom. In a study of the 
effects of instructional strategies on achievement in eighth grade Social Studies and 
English classes, Gamoran and Nystrand (1991) found that authentic discussion that 
allowed students to contribute their own thoughts and ideas occurred on average less than 
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one minute per day. Similarly, in a follow-up study of eighth- and ninth-grade English 
and Social Studies classrooms, they found that; “discussion in English took 50 seconds 
per class in eighth grade and less than 15 seconds in ninth grade. Average time for 
discussion in Social Studies was 42 seconds in eighth grade and 31.2 seconds in ninth 
grade” (Nystrand, Wu, Gamoran, Zeiser, & Long, 2003, p. 178). Moreover, in these 
discussions, teachers most often requested memorized facts from students rather than 
press or pull for elaborated conversation. Thus, increasing discussion and debate, 
particularly in earlier grades and preschool through activities that combine exploration 
and instruction may be an important lever for developing children’s inquiry and 
explanatory skills. Indeed, recent work demonstrates that increasing discussion and 
debate in middle school classrooms influences children’s language development 
(Lawrence, Crosson, Paré-Blagoev, & Snow, 2015).  
Final thoughts 
How do children make sense of the world? One influential view is that young 
children are “little scientists” who independently make inferences and test hypotheses as 
they interact with the world around them. Another influential view is that children are 
profoundly shaped by the people around them. These two perspectives complement each 
other and suggest that children may indeed be more like little scientist than has been 
originally argued. That is, young children are not independently making sense of the 
work through exploration. Instead, just like “real” scientists, their exploration of the 
world is shaped by their community and what they learn, in turn, shapes their interaction 
with their community and changes the community itself.   
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Appendix A 
A pre-test was conducted with a sample of 16 younger (M = 3.97, SD = .53, R = 
2.94 – 4.67) and 16 older children (M = 5.70, SD = .66, R = 4.97 – 7.06) to assess 
children’s perception of each hybrid. For each child we presented 10 hybrids (75%-25% 
from Jaswal & Markman, 2007): 5 animals (cat-dog, horse-cow, squirrel-rabbit, bear-pig, 
bird-fish) and 5 objects (spoon-key, car-shoe, button-ball, hat-cup, pen-toothbrush). The 
experimenter presented the ten hybrids one at a time using laminated pictures and told 
children: “I am going to show you a picture, do you think this is a [75% label] or a [25% 
label]?” The order of the labels was counterbalanced across children. The experimenter 
randomized the order of presentation of the hybrids by shuffling the pictures before 
testing each child.  
Potential age differences were assessed using a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis 
of variance. Two items had marginally significant main effects of age group and were 
therefore deemed inappropriate for the experiment (button-ball: c2 (1, N=32) = 3.36, p = 
.067; horse-cow: c2 (1, N=32) = 3.74, p = .053).  We combined the remaining eight items 
into two sets. Each set contained two animals and two objects: set 1 (cat-dog = 84%, 
squirrel-rabbit = 75%, hat-cup = 94%, pen-toothbrush = 41%); set 2 (bird-fish = 88%, 
bear-pig = 66%, car-shoe = 84%, spoon-key = 63%). Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of 
variance revealed no age-group differences for set 1 or set 2. To confirm that these sets 
did not differ from each other, we added the four items from each set and compared them 
using a paired-samples t-test. This confirmed that set 1 (M = 2.94, SD = .80) and set 2 (M 
= 3.00, SD = .88) did not differ from each other, t(31) = -.39, ns.. We also tested for 
differences between animals and objects. We combined all four animal items together to 
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create an animal composite and combined all four object items together to create an 
object composite. Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance revealed no age-group 
differences for the object composite or the animal composite. We compared the animal 
composite (M = 3.13, SD = .87) and object composite (M = 2.81, SD = 1.00) using a 
using a paired-samples t-test.  These two composites did not differ from each other, t(31) 
= 1.43, ns.  
Below, we display the final stimuli and accompanying reasoning questions 
associated with each hybrid for set 1 and set 2. The hybrids combined 75% of one animal 
or object and 25% from another. The first mentioned name (italicized) contributed 75% 
of the perceptual evidence for the hybrid 
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Set Hybrid Picture Reasoning Question 
1 Cat-dog 
Do you think this animal barks or 
meows? 
1 Squirrell-rabitt 
Do you think this animal eats nuts 
or carrots?  
1 Hat-cup 
Do you think people use it to drink 
or wear it on their head?  
1 Pen-toothbrush 
Do you think people use it to brush 
their teeth or to write? 
2 Bird-fish 
Do you think this animal flies or 
swims?  
2 Bear-pig 
Do you think this animal growls or 
oinks? 
2 Car-shoe 
Do you think people drive it or 
wear it on their feet? 
2 Spoon-key 
Do you think people use it to open 
doors or to eat? 
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Appendix B 
A pre-test was conducted with a sample of 16 younger (11 females, M = 4.48, SD 
= .39, R = 3.78 – 4.99) and 16 older children (9 females, M = 6.27, SD = .39, R = 5.63 – 
6.81) to assess children’s perception of each hybrid. For each child we presented 10 
hybrids (75%-25% from Jaswal & Markman, 2007): 5 animals (cat-dog, horse-cow, 
squirrel-rabbit, bear-pig, bird-fish) and 5 objects (spoon-key, car-shoe, button-ball, hat-
cup, pen-toothbrush). The experimenter presented the ten hybrids one at a time using 
laminated pictures and told children: “I am going to show you a picture, do you think this 
is a [75% label] or a [25% label]?” The order of the labels was counterbalanced across 
children. The experimenter randomized the order of presentation of the hybrids by 
shuffling the pictures before testing each child.  
Potential age differences were assessed using a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis 
of variance. One item had a marginally significant main effect of age group and was 
therefore deemed inappropriate for the experiment (pen-toothbrush: c2 (1, N=32) = 3.35, 
p = .067).  We selected eight of the remaining nine items to create two sets of four items 
each. Each set contained two animals and two objects: set 1 (cat-dog = 81%, bear-pig = 
72%, hat-cup = 100%, button-ball = 31%); set 2 (bird-fish = 91%, squirrel-rabbit = 47%, 
car-shoe = 91%, spoon-key = 69%).  Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance 
revealed no age-group differences for set 1 or set 2. To confirm that these sets did not 
differ from each other, we added the four items from each set and compared them using a 
paired-samples t-test. This confirmed that set 1 (M = 2.97, SD = .69) and set 2 (M = 2.75, 
SD = .84) did not differ from each other, t(31) = -.39, ns. We also tested for differences 
between animals and objects. We combined all four animal items together to create an 
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animal composite and combined all four object items together to create an object 
composite. Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance revealed no age-group 
differences for the object composite or the animal composite. We compared the animal 
composite (M = 2.91, SD = .89) and object composite (M = 2.81, SD = .82) using a using 
a paired-samples t-test.  These two composites did not differ from each other, t(31) = 
1.56, ns. 
Below, we display the final stimuli and accompanying reasoning questions 
associated with each hybrid for set 1 and set 2.  The hybrids combined 75% of one animal 
or object and 25% from another. The first mentioned name (italicized) contributed 75% 
of the perceptual evidence for the hybrid.  
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Set Hybrid Picture Reasoning Question 
1 Cat-dog 
Do you think this animal barks or 
meows? 
1 Squirrell-rabitt 
Do you think this animal eats nuts 
or carrots?  
1 Hat-cup 
Do you think people use it to drink 
or wear it on their head?  
1 Button-Ball 
Do you think people use it to play 
or to put on their shirt? 
2 Bird-fish 
Do you think this animal flies or 
swims?  
2 Bear-pig 
Do you think this animal growls or 
oinks? 
2 Car-shoe 
Do you think people drive it or 
wear it on their feet? 
2 Spoon-key 
Do you think people use it to open 
doors or to eat? 
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Appendix C 
Analyses of whether children picked up the smallest and the biggest doll concurrently. 
A significant interaction between Age Group and Testimony Type emerged (Table C1). 
Preschoolers’ exploration did not differ by type of testimony, GLH Test: c2(1) = .72, p > 
.25. However, significantly more elementary school children explored following counter-
intuitive than confirming testimony, GLH Test: c2(1) = 6.11, p = .013. Thus, more 
elementary school children than preschool children explored following counter-intuitive 
testimony, GLH Test: c2(1) = 7.49, p = .006, whereas there was no age difference in 
exploration following confirming testimony, GLH Test: c2(1) = .99, p > .25. There were 
no further interactions.  
Table C1. Logistic regression model comparing whether children picked up the biggest 
and smallest dolls as a function of the type of testimony children received, whether they 
received a prompt, and their age.  
Model 2 
Odds-Ratios z scores 95% CI 
Counter-Intuitive Testimony .37 .85 .04, 3.70 
Elementary 2.03 .99 .50, 8.19 
Prompt 1.93 1.54 .84, 4.47 
Counter-Intuitive X Elementary 8.81 1.71~ .71, 106.44 
Constant .05* 4.49*** .01, .18 
X2 23.19*** 
Model df 4 
-2 Log Likelihood 149.32 
~ p = .087; * p < .05; ** p = .011; *** p < .001. Note. n = 200. 
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Appendix D 
Children’s decision to explore was unrelated to whether they endorsed or rejected the 
experimenter’s testimony.  
Whether children endorsed the experimenter’s testimony that smallest = heaviest or stuck 
to their initial intuition that biggest = heaviest was unrelated to their decision to pick up 
the biggest and smallest doll during the experimenter’s absence, 65.48% vs. 58.33%, 
c2(1, n = 96) = 0. 32, p = .63. This was true for preschool and elementary school children, 
c2(1, n = 38) = 0.97, p = .32, c2(1, n = 58) = 01.23, p = .27, respectively.  
 Children’s decision to explore was unrelated to the type of explanation they provided 
following their endorsement or rejection.  
Did children’s explanation for their judgment following the receipt of counter-intuitive 
testimony predict their decision to explore the dolls? To answer this question, we used 
logistic regression to regress children’s decision to pick up the biggest and the smallest 
doll on their age (Elementary vs. Preschool) and on the type of explanation they 
provided. We entered the type of explanation as a set of two dummy variables with no 
explanation as the reference category. We did not include children who provided an 
explanation coded as Bigger = Heavier because only 3 children provided this 
explanation. Note, in Table D1, we provide the percentage of children in each age group 
who explored as a function of the type of explanation they provided. We display the 
results the aforementioned regression model in Table D2. Children’s age was the only 
statistical significant predictor. Elementary school children explored significantly more 
than preschool children, controlling for the type of explanation that children provided. 
Explanation type was not a significant predictors of children’s exploration. That is, when 
considered as a set, the dummy variables representing explanation type did not explain a 
115 
statistically significant amount of variation in children’s search for evidence, GLH Test: 
c2(2) = 4.51, p = .11.  
Table D1. Percentage of children in each age group who explored as a function of 
the type of explanation they provided.  
Explanation Type Explored 
Preschool Children (n = 38) 
Other (n = 14) 36% 
Bigger = Heavier (n = 3) 33% 
Smaller = Heavier (n = 20) 30% 
Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight  (n = 1) 100% 
Elementary School Children (n = 58) 
Other (n = 6)  50% 
Bigger = Heavier  
Smaller = Heavier (n = 23) 83% 
Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight (n = 29) 93% 
116 
Table D2. Logistic regression predicting whether children picked up the biggest and 
smallest dolls as a function of their age and the type of explanation they provided.  
Model 1 
Odds-Ratios z scores 95% CI 
Elementary 5.63** 3.11 1.90, 16.70 
Size Sometimes Unrelated to Weight 7.24* 2.09 1.14, 46.21 
Smaller = Heavier 1.51 .69 .46, 4.95 
Constant .39 1.82 .14, 1.08 
X2 30.07*** 
Model df 3 
-2 Log Likelihood 88.89 
* p < .05; ** p = .011; *** p < .001. Note. n = 93. The explanation type “Other” is the
reference category for the two variables representing explanation type. Three children 
who provided an explanation coded as Biggest = Heaviest were not included in this 
analysis.  
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Appendix D 
Children made a judgment about the weight of the dolls: (1) immediately after the 
opportunity to explore the dolls by E1; (ii) when explicitly asked by E2; and (iii) when 
invited by E2 to select the heaviest paperweight. In table E1, we display the percentage of 
preschool and elementary school children who endorsed the biggest doll as the heaviest at 
each time point in each condition. To assess the stability of children’s judgments over these 
three points we regressed using a multi-level logistic regression model (Stata 14’s –xtlogit- 
command) children’s judgements on the timing of these judgments using two dummy 
variables (Explicit Judgement with E2 and Paperweight Task with E2, the reference 
category was Explicit Judgement with E1). This allowed us to compare whether children’s 
judgements changed significantly across the three time points. We conducted these 
analyses separately for each type of testimony. 
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Table E1. Percentage of preschool and elementary school children who endorsed the 
biggest doll as the heaviest (1) immediately after the opportunity to explore the dolls 
when questioned by E1; (ii) when explicitly asked by E2; and (iii) when invited by E2 to 
select the heaviest paperweight. 
Following Opportunity 
to Explore with E1 
Initial Judgement 
with E2 
Paperweight 
Task 
Confirming  
Preschool (n = 43) 98% 98% 81% 
Elementary (n = 61) 97% 100% 92% 
Total (n = 104) 97% 99% 88% 
Counter-Intuitive   
Preschool (n = 38) 34% 37% 45% 
Elementary (n = 58) 48% 52% 69% 
Total (n = 96) 43% 46% 59% 
Confirming Testimony: We found that when children received confirming testimony the 
proportion of children who stated that the biggest doll was the heaviest did not differ 
whether children were asked by E1 or by E2 in a direct manner, i.e., “Which doll do you 
think is the heaviest?”, z = 1.15, p = .25. However, when asked to select a heavy 
paperweight by E2 children were significantly less likely to select the biggest doll 
relative to when they were asked in a direct manner by E1 and E2, z = 2.54, p = .01. 
However, when we tested whether this pattern applied to both preschool and elementary 
school children, we found that Elementary school children’s judgement that biggest = 
heaviest did not change significantly across the three time points. In contrast, preschool 
children were significantly less likely to select the biggest doll on the paperweight task 
relative to when they were asked in a direct manner by E1 and E2, 98% vs. 81%, 
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McNemar tests = .016 (see Table E1). Thus, children’s judgements about the weight of 
the doll in the confirming testimony condition were generally stable. When asked directly 
about the weight of the dolls by a second experimenter they had never met before, most 
of the preschool and elementary school children provided answers that were similar to 
those they had given to E1 after they had had an opportunity to explore the dolls. 
Moreover, Elementary school children provided equivalent answers whether E2 asked 
them directly or indirectly (i.e., by asking them to select a heavy paperweight). Preschool 
children deviated from this pattern; they were less likely to select the largest doll as a 
suitable paperweight. However, the vast majority of preschoolers continued to endorse 
the biggest doll as the heaviest.  
Counter-Intuitive Testimony: We found that when children received counter-intutive 
testimony the proportion of children who stated that the biggest doll was the heaviest did 
not differ whether children were asked by E1 or by E2 in a direct manner, i.e., “Which 
doll do you think is the heaviest?”, z = 1.05, p > .25. However, when asked to select a 
heavy paperweight by E2 children were significantly less likely to select the biggest doll 
relative to when they were asked in a direct manner by E1 and E2, z = 5.57, p > .001.  
We followed up on this interaction by investigating whether being asked about the 
doll’s weight differed as a function of children’s age and whether they had received a 
prime. In Figure E1, we display the proportion of children receiving counter-intuitive 
testimony who stated that biggest = heaviest at three successive time-points: immediately 
after having had the opportunity to explore the dolls (i.e., children’s final judgment with 
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E1); when asked by E2; and when invited by E2 to select the heaviest paperweight. 
Figure E1 displays these proportions for each of the four combinations of age and prime. 
We compared children’s judgment that biggest = heaviest when they were asked 
by E1 following their opportunity to explore the dolls and by E2 (directly and indirectly) 
using McNemar c2 tests for each of the four combinations of age and prompt. We 
adjusted our significance level from p = .05 to p = .0125 using a Bonferroni correction to 
minimize the possibility of a Type 1 error. Being asked by a novel experimenter about the 
weight of the dolls did not increase the proportion of children who stated that biggest = 
heaviest (all p values > .18) for any of the four combinations of age and prompt. Thus, 
whatever claim children had made in E1’s presence they also made in E2’s presence.  
We then evaluated whether the manner in which E2 asked children about the 
weight of the dolls influenced their judgments by comparing children’s judgment that 
biggest = heaviest when E2 asked the question first directly and then indirectly (i.e., in 
the paperweight task) using McNemar c2 tests for each of the four combinations of age 
and prompt. We again adjusted the significance level to p = 0.0125. Being asked 
indirectly rather than directly about the weight of the dolls had a significant impact on the 
judgments of one group only: elementary school children who received a prompt 
(McNemar c2(1) = 7.00, p = 0.0082; all other groups p > .16). These children went from 
endorsing biggest = heaviest 58% of the time to 81% of the time when asked indirectly in 
the paperweight task. By contrast, the remaining children made a similar judgement 
whether E2 asked about the weight of the dolls directly or indirectly.  
Thus, children’s judgements about the weight of the doll were generally stable. 
When asked directly about the weight of the dolls by a second experimenter they had 
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never met before, most of the preschool and elementary school children provided answers 
that were similar to those they had given to E1 after they had had an opportunity to 
explore the dolls. Indeed, children provided equivalent answers whether E2 asked them 
directly or indirectly (i.e., by asking them to select a heavy paperweight). Only one group 
deviated from this pattern; elementary school children who had received a prompt to 
explore the dolls were more likely to select the largest doll as a suitable paperweight.  
Conclusion: Given the relative stability of children’s judgements across the three time 
points in both the confirming and counter-intuitive testimony conditions, we added 
together the three judgements children made following the opportunity to explore the 
dolls (i.e., their judgement with E1, their judgement with E2, and the judgement they 
made as part of the paperweight task they completed with E2) 
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Figure E1. Proportion of preschool and elementary school children receiving counter-intuitive 
testimony who endorsed the biggest doll as the heaviest doll immediately following their 
opportunity to explore the dolls (E1), when asked by E2, and when asked to select a heavy 
paperweight by E2 as a function of whether children were or were not given a prime to explore 
the dolls. 
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